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This thesis introduces a computational model of emotions and decisions for
a robot, which interacts meaningfully in a social context. The decision mak-
ing framework is based on multi-attribute utility theory, but it contains a
dynamic and adaptive emotional model which basically acts as a preference
and perception manipulator.
The emotional model is based on event appraisal with discrete emotion
categories. Events are assessed using dimensions of utility and probabil-
ity as well as expectations. The model uses the concepts of core affect and
attributed affect to create a multilevel emotion consisting of moods and
emotional events. Personality traits are used to create different emotional
dynamics by modifying relevant parameters. Attitudes and relationships,
understood through attributed affect and classical conditioning, make the
robot emotions more believable. The robot learns from user actions and
makes predictions about them and environment changes according to prob-
abilistic models.
Subjective well being and human need hierarchy are used as the basis for
the preferences which the visceral state affects. The model is inspired by
the computational models Cathexis, FLAME, EMA, TAME and Robocep-
tionist, and is an expanded version of the model used in AISoy1 robot. The
framework combines extensive psychological research and requires valida-
tion.
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Työssä kehitetään tunteiden ja päätösten laskennallinen malli robotille,
jotta se voisi käyttäytyä sosiaalisissa tilanteissa järkevästi. Päätöksente-
komalli perustuu monitavoitteeseen arvoteoriaan, mutta sitä on muutettu
niin, että tunnemalli säätelee mieltymyksiä sekä tulkintaa dynaamisesti
ja mukautuvasti.
Tunnemalli perustuu tapahtuma-arviointiin ja diskreetteihin tunnekate-
gorioihin. Tapahtumia arvioidaan käyttämällä hyötyä, todennäköisyyksiä
sekä odotuksia ulottuvuuksina. Malli käyttää ydintunnetilaa ja liitettyä
tunnetilaa luodakseen monikerroksisen tunteen, joka sisältää mielialan ja
tunteikkaita tapahtumia. Persoonallisuuspiirteillä saadaan aikaan moni-
puolisia tunnedynamiikkoja säätämällä asianmukaisia parametreja. Asen-
teet ja suhteet tekevät robotista uskottavamman, ja ne ymmärretään liite-
tyn tunnetilan sekä klassisen ehdollistamisen avulla. Robotti oppii käyttä-
jän teoista ja tekee niistä sekä ympäristön kehityksestä ennusteita toden-
näköisyyspohjaisilla malleilla.
Subjektiivinen hyvinvointi ja ihmisen tarvehierarkia antavat mieltymys-
ten painotukselle pohjan, jota robotin sisäinen tila muokkaa. Laskennalli-
set mallit Cathexis, FLAME, EMA, TAME and Roboceptionist inspiroivat
mallia, joka on laajennettu versio AISoy1 robotin mallista. Kehys yhdistää
laajaa psykologista tutkimusta ja vaatii testausta.
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1.1. Emotions and decisions
Traditionally, decision theory has acknowledged emotions as a biasing factor
in decision making and sought to remove it from the decision making process.
When an animal is threatened by a predator, it can be immobilized by fear
even if an escape would be more useful (Janis & Leventhal 1967). Earthquake
insurances are bought more after earthquakes while the probability of a new
accident stays constant (Palm, Hodgson, Blanchard & Lyons 1990). It seems
then that emotions should be suppressed in decision making, because they
modify preferences and judgements.
However, emotions often appear purposeful when they are not extreme. When
seeing a bear raises fear, a flight mechanism can help in reacting quickly in-
stead of assessing probabilities and utilities between climbing a tree, running
or fighting (LeDoux 1995). Indeed, new research in neurology shows that it
is very difficult for humans to act effectively without emotional capabilities
(Damasio 1994). As an example, a patient called Elliot, a man with a family
and a job, suffered damage in his ventromedial prefrontal cortex in a surgery.
He scored normal in neurological and intelligence tests but he could not make
everyday decisions smoothly anymore. He lost his wife and his job, and had to
spend half an hour to conduct cost-benefit analysis in choosing between two
dates. Railway worker Phineas Cage suffered damage in the same part of the
brain and his life failed afterwards as well (Damasio & Grabowski 1994). This
brain area is responsible for linking events with emotional states (Bechara
et al. 2000).
Not only are emotions useful for decision making but they are such an in-
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tegral part of it that they cannot be ignored when realistic decision models
are constructed. In the ultimatum game, two players split a given amount of
money. The first player chooses how much he keeps and how much is offered
to the second player. The second player can accept the offer, or reject it and
neither player gets anything. In theory the first player should offer as little as
possible and the second player should accept because a small amount is bet-
ter than nothing. But unfair offers often cause anger and are rejected, which
can be seen as an activation in brain areas related to emotion (Sanfey, Rilling,
Aronson, Nystrom & Cohen 2003).
In politics, voters may shift their preferences depending on their mood. Anxi-
ety and fear promote attention to political argumentation as focus is on prob-
lem solving and survival. New information is searched and candidates are
challenged. On the other hand, enthusiasm and joy cause voters to be more
habitual, and emotional associations with candidate party and background
are more important (Marcus & Mackuen 1993). Even very serious and influ-
ential decisions can be based on emotions. It has been suggested that part of
president Bush’s motivation to start the war in Iraq was revenge for Hussein’s
earlier attempt to assassinate his father (McDermott 2004).
Emotions are not perfectly defined in the sense that there is still debate on
what emotions are (Russell 2003). Especially important is whether there are
some basic emotions (Ekman & Friesen 1971, Ortony & Turner 1990, Lev-
enson, Ekman, Heider & Friesen 1992, Izard 1992, Panksepp 1992, Turner
& Ortony 1992), how emotions evolve (Zajonc 1984, Lazarus 1984, Frijda,
Kuipers & ter Schure 1989, Roseman et al. 1990), what the dimensions of
emotions are (Russell & Barrett 1999, Larsen & McGraw 2001) and what
their effects on decisions are (Leone, Perugini & Bagozzi 2005, Forgas 1995).
But it is clear that emotions affect decisions in several ways, from weighing
criteria and evaluating alternatives (Lerner & Keltner 2000) to mood congru-
ency of memories (Rusting & DeHart 2000) affecting predictions.
1.2. Affective robots and models
The new research in psychology and neuroscience has inspired emotion, which
is often called affect (Russell & Barrett 1999) when it is coupled with simi-
lar concepts such as mood (Beedie et al. 2005), to be taken as part of com-
putational models of intelligent agents. Affective computing combines the
research to produce machines which are able to recognize, model and com-
municate emotions to enhance human computer interaction (HCI) and aid
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related research in suprising ways (Picard 1997, Picard 2003). For example,
Decision Affect Theory (Mellers, Schwatz, Ho & Ritov 1997) provided empiri-
cal evidence of the effect of expectations on emotion generation, which could
be used to support motive-consistency as a dimension in Roseman’s event
appraisal theory (Roseman et al. 1990). Extensive models such as TAME
(Moshkina 2006) create demand for research connecting different theories
like personality traits and their effects on emotions. Several computational
models for emotions have been created, some with physical implementation,
which we briefly describe.
1.2.1. Decision Affect Theory
Decision Affect Theory (DAT) translates risk, or probability, and expectations
for events to a one-dimensional feeling which might be compared to the va-
lence dimension of Russell (2003). It is motivated by regret and dissappoint-
ment theories, and tries to capture the effect of other alternatives on experi-
enced benefit of an outcome. Equation 1.1 shows the formula for an emotional
response to an outcome. The theory was experimented with different obtained
and unobtained outcomes and probabilities. Mellers et al. (1997) achieved an
excellent fit with less than 1% residual variance. The model is





g(ua   ub)  sb
#
+ d; (1.1)
whereRa is the emotional response to outcome a, c > 0 and d are coefficients in
the judgement function, ua and ub are utilities of the obtained and unobtained
outcomes, sb is the subjective probability of event b and g() is a dissappoint-
ment function. A larger emotional response implies the superior emotional
utility of an outcome.
The effect of emotional responses of outcomes in gambles on choices between
gambles was also examined. Subjective expected emotion was calculated as
a sum of expected responses for outcomes
P
siRi. The correlation between
binary choices and expected emotion predictions of the gambles was 0.89 sug-
gesting that the emotional content of alternatives was a major factor in the de-
cisions. This is similar to the idea of the somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara
et al. 2000). DAT shows that expectations and risks affect emotions but does
not differentiate between discrete emotions. (Mellers et al. 1997)
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1.2.2. Cathexis
Velásquez’ Cathexis model uses different sources of releasers for emotion gen-
eration and for other systems. The releasers are either natural, e.g. signals
resulting from various sensors or chemical reactions in brain, or learned re-
leasers, e.g. conditioning sound of hitting with pain and fear. The activation
of basic systems is a nonlinear function, such as a standard ramp function,
of weighted sum of relevant releasers for the system. Also the states of other
systems can be input for activation functions. For example, the hunger drive
system could cause the distress emotional system to activate. Emotional sys-
tems also include a decay function in the activation function variable. Re-
leasers are divided in four categories: neural, sensorimotor, motivational and
cognitive, inspired by Izard (Izard 1993). The activation function variable












where Ai(t) is the activation of emotional system i at time t, 	i() is temporal
decay function of emotion i, Rki is the value of releaser k andWki is the corre-
sponding weight for the emotion, li is the excitatory (positive) or inhibitory
(negative) strength of emotional system l, and f() is a limiting function such
as a standard ramp or a logistic sigmoid function.
Figure 1.1: The framework of Cathexis (Velásquez 1998)
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Behavioural systems are activated with a similar function of releasers and
other system activity but without decay. Emotional conditioning happens
through learned releasers. Weights for releasers that are simultaneous with
an activated system are increased. The model framework is shown in Figure
1.1. A downside is that the model does not learn to expect future events. Our
model does not include neural or sensorimotor processes, but motivational
states are adapted.
1.2.3. FLAME
FLAME is a model which uses both event appraisal, formulated through
fuzzy rules, and motivational states, such as pain, for emotion generation.
Emotions are based on evaluating the effect of events on goals and they are
used in selecting behaviour. Event appraisal is based on Roseman’s (Roseman
et al. 1990) and Ortony’s (Ortony, Clore & Collins 1988) theories, and Bolles’
fear-pain model (Bolles & Fanselow 1980). The architecture can be seen in
Figure 1.2. (El-Nasr et al. 2000)
Figure 1.2: The framework of FLAME (El-Nasr et al. 2000)
The impact of an event on a goal and the importance of a goal, both repre-
sented as fuzzy sets, are used to calculate the fuzzy desirability with a rule
database. Desirability is finally defuzzified with Mamdani’s centroid defuzzi-
fication (Mamdani & Assilian 1975). Desirability and learned expectation, or
probability, of an event elicit emotions according to Ortony’s model. Some pa-
rameters are taken from Price’s model (Price, Barrell & Barrell 1985). Figure
1.3 shows the calculations of corresponding emotion intensities. Altogether
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fourteen emotions are modeled. In addition to desirability, the agent’s stan-
dards, or moral, as well as learned attitude towards objects are used for some
of them. Emotions decay in time as a product of a decay factor and previous
intensity. Motivational states can also affect emotion e.g. when pain inhibits
fear. Intense motivational states interrupt cognitive processes to choose rel-
evant goals. Mood is calculated as a moving sum of positive and negative
emotion intensities and is either positive or negative. Moods are used to in-
hibit opposite emotions. (El-Nasr et al. 2000)
Figure 1.3: Emotion intensities in FLAME (El-Nasr et al. 2000)
Behaviour is selected with fuzzy rules that consist of emotional states, events
and causes of events. Selection is made based on the highest score. The
agent learns in several ways. It uses average intensity of events relating
to an object to simulate classical conditioning. Kaelbling’s Q-learning is used
to relate state - action pairs to expected reward values (Kaelbling, Littman
& Moore 1996). It is modified to include probability distributions of future
states because of the uncertainty regarding the user’s actions and respective
rewards. Mood is used to modify the belief about positive and negative re-
wards. A user model keeps in memory the frequency of user actions given two
past actions, i.e. updates conditional probabilities of action chains of three
steps. A user action leads to a new state that is used in the Q-learning val-
uation. An alternative approach using an average score of feedback value to
actions can be used for selecting behaviour. The model is implemented in a
virtual environment. A survey with 21 subjects revealed that learning is vital
for making the virtual agent believable. (El-Nasr et al. 2000)
FLAME is an extensive model and has some very relevant components. The
logic of using desirability, or utility, and expectations, or probability, for event
appraisal is adapted to our model. Also a split user model is used for fore-
casting user actions, taking into account user action history and reactions.
Attitudes are used to create emotional relationships with users. However, a
decision theoretic approach is used for selecting actions and fuzzy logic is not
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used, as it complicates forecasting and the survey did not reveal clear benefits
compared to real numbers.
1.2.4. EMA
Gratch introduces a domain independent model, EMA, for emotions. It is
based on event appraisal based emotion generation but it uses the idea of
coping strategies to react to the environment. The model focuses on a cogni-
tive emotion system and leaves out motivational states and reactions. Cop-
ing strategies aim at changing the environment through actions (problem-
focused coping) or the interpretation of events (emotion-focused coping) to
better satisfy the subject in relation to goals. The used emotional system
is shown in Figure 1.4 and is adapted from Smith and Lazarus’ theory (Smith
& Lazarus 1990). (Gratch & Marsella 2004)
Figure 1.4: The computational cognitive-motivational-emotional sys-
tem of EMA (Gratch & Marsella 2004)
The algorithm interprets first world events in terms of some appraisal dimen-
sions. Then, emotions are calculated based on a simplified version of Elliot’s
Affective Reasoner (Figure 1.5) and a coping strategy is chosen (Elliott 1992).
Examples of coping strategies are active coping: taking active steps to try
to remove or circumvent the stressor, and seeking social support for emo-
tional reasons: getting moral support, sympathy, or understanding. (Gratch
& Marsella 2004)
EMA is implemented in a virtual reality training environment called Mission
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Figure 1.5: Emotion intensities in EMA (Gratch & Marsella 2004)
Rehearsal Exercise (MRE) system and is incorporated to the Steve -agent ar-
chitecture (Rickel & Johnson 1999). Multiple characters in the environment
are controlled by intelligent agents using EMA. These characters play the
roles of locals, friendly and hostile forces, and other mission team members.
MRE is a broad 3D system which also covers natural language processing
(NLP) and dialogue management as well as environment perception and ges-
tures including facial expressions. However, EMA is very different from our
model because we do not use the concept of coping and behaviour is controlled
by expected utility maximization. (Gratch & Marsella 2004)
1.2.5. TAME
The TAME - Traits (Personality), Attitudes, Moods and Emotions - model is a
very extensive emotional model. It uses the Big Five (Openness, Concientious-
ness, Extraversion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism) personality trait theory
that has been shown to be consistent across cultures (McCrae & P. T. Costa
1997). Traits influence behavioural parameters via functional mappings, e.g.
the degree of neuroticism would be proportional to obstacle avoidance param-
eter and inversely proportional to wander parameter. Also, they have an effect
on emotion generation like mood. Attitudes are modeled as an object depen-
dent real number which is affected by mood, and they guide behaviour away
from aversive objects. Emotions are discrete. The framework of TAME is
shown in Figure 1.6. (Moshkina 2006)
For emotion generation, TAME adapts five properties from Picard (1997): ac-
tivation (as in Cathexis), saturation, response decay, limited linearity, and
personality and mood influences. Interestingly, personality affects the acti-
vation point, peak response and rise time to peak for an emotional stimulus.
Mood varies the threshold of experiencing emotion. The equation for base
emotion is shown in Equation 1.3 and the influences of personality and mood
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Figure 1.6: The framework of TAME (Moshkina 2006)
on it can be seen in Figure 1.7. The current emotion is a weighted average




e(si ai)=di   e ai=di if ai  si < (ai + bi)=2
gi   e (si bi)=di if si  (ai + bi)=2
; (1.3)
where bi = diln(gi + e ai=di) + ai, Ei;base is the base value of emotion i, si > 0
is the emotional signal strength, ai > 0 controls the activation point, di > 0
controls the maximum slope, bi > 0 controls the point where growth rate is
reversed and gi > 0 is the peak value.
Moods evolve though environmental, e.g. light, battery level, and situational,
e.g. emotional episodes, variables and are longer lasting than emotions. Mood
is two-dimensional, consisting of positive and negative mood variables. The
effect of environmental variables is propotional to their distance from neutral
level. Emotions contribute according to their valence and intensity. Atti-
tudes towards object develop through perceived attributes and are directed
according to mood. TAME offers an interesting implementation for multilevel
affect. Our model shares the Big Five personality trait theory and mood evo-
lution but mood is represented in pleasure and activation dimensions. We
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Figure 1.7: Influences of personality and mood on emotion generation
in TAME (Moshkina 2006)
understand attitudes through emotional conditioning and they are discrete
emotional tags on affetive objects, or people, that affect and are affected by
current emotions. (Moshkina 2006)
1.2.6. Decision Field Theory
Busemeyer provides an integrated approach, Decision Field Theory (DFT), for
emotional decision making that is closer to decision theory than the previous
models. The model consists of a dynamic stochastic preference model which
activates one alternative when a threshold value is reached. The weights wij
for alternative i and consequence j are used with values mj in the current
utility function. (Busemeyer, Dimperio & Jessup 2007)
A stationary stochastic process Wij(t), E(Wij) = wij, determines momentary
weights. The utility is then Ui(t) =
P
Wij(t)mj with mean ui(t) =
P
wij(t)mj.
Consequence values mj are determined by an affective mechanism. To cal-
culate preference states, valence is calculated as the difference between an
alternative’s utility and the average utility vi(t) = Ui(t) U(t). The preference
can be then modified with a linear dynamic stochastic difference equation
Pi(t + h) =
P
sijPj(t) + vi(t + h), where feedback coefficients sij are used to
produce a competitive system. (Busemeyer et al. 2007)
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To determine values mj, the concept of needs nk, including emotions, is used.
Unsatisfied needs accumulate over time and their weight for mj increases.
The value qjk for consequence j regarding attribute k is used to form the
weigted consequence value mj =
P
nkqjk. Needs develop through linear dy-
namic equations nk(t + h) = Lknk(t) + [gk   ak(t + h)], where Lk is a feedback
constant, gk is a goal level and ak(t + h) is the current level related to need k.
(Busemeyer et al. 2007)
DFT is an interesting formulation but does not explain the evolution of emo-
tion in detail. However, it does use normalized utility in calculating valence
which is supported by suggestions that the value of an alternative depends on
other alternatives and that framing has a significant effect on choice (Tversky
& Kahneman 1992). In our model, decisions are made in a reactive manner
in contrast to the threshold approach used by DFT.
1.2.7. Roboceptionist
Roboceptionist is a social robot that builds long-term relationships with peo-
ple in that it assists them in basic things such as finding places at a university.
It has emotions, moods and attitudes. Kirby, Forlizzi & Simmons (2010) fol-
low Ekman & Friesen (1971) in choosing subset of joy, sadness, disgust and
anger as basic emotions. Both exprienced past events and anticipated future
events affect the one-dimensional mood value according to their strength and
distance along a sigmoid curve. Daily base mood is then a sum of different
events’ contributions to it. Displayed mood changes smoothly after events,
following a logistic function. (Kirby et al. 2010)
Emotions are triggered by communication and emotional content is inter-
preted using hand-coded rules. Only one emotion is shown at a time and
it lasts a short time, so normally mood is displayed. Mood affects emotional
reactions. The experienced emotion depends on the intensity and valence of
the emotion, and mood. Attitude is one-dimensional and long-lasting. The
evolution depends on a familiarity measure that combines the time since the
previous interaction and total interaction time. After an interaction, the atti-
tude is updated proportional to the mood change during interaction and the
additive inverse of familiarity. Using familiarity in attitude formation is a
good idea and it is adapted from this model. (Kirby et al. 2010)
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1.2.8. AISoy1
This model, based on Adversarial Risk Analysis (ARA) (Ríos Insua, Ríos &
Banks 2009) framework, is a decision theoretic approach to affective deci-
sion making in a multiactor environment. The model is implemented in the
AISoy1 robot. It uses forecasting models to make predictions about future
user actions and environment states. The models are updated as new in-
formation is used for learning about users. Forecasts and learning make it
possible for the agent to assess alternatives in a strategic manner and take
into account dynamics in an interactive environment. The decision process is
shown in Figure 1.8. (Esteban 2012)
Figure 1.8: The decision process in ARA (Esteban 2012)
The framework consists of an agent A that is controlled by the model and
human users B1; : : : ; Br 2 Bu who interact with the agent in an environment
E. A has a finite action set A = fa1; : : : ; amg and users Bu0s have a different
interpreted action set B = fb1; : : : ; bng including a do nothing action. The
environment E has dynamic states within a set E . (Esteban 2012)
A reads external environment with sensors q at times t and the sensor read-
ing vector is st = (s1t ; : : : ; s
q
t ). Using the readings, A infers the environment
state, current user and previous action with probabilistic functions. Future
states are then evaluated with conditional probabilities calculated with those
functions. The consequences of states and actions are input for the utility
function which is used in action selection. Dynamic programming solves the
maximum expected utility. (Esteban 2012)
Emotions in the model are discrete and based on Gratch, Marsella, Wang &
Stankovic (2009) (Rázuri, Esteban & Ríos Insua 2011). They evolve based on
events, i.e. robot and user actions, and are mixed in the sense that multiple
emotions can occur simultaneously. The emotional state is updated with a
probabilistic function that considers previous emotions, event utility and dis-
tance to expectation. Utility is in turn affected by emotions that determine
criteria weights. The framework is the basis of our decision making model and
the presented emotional model is integrated into it. Formulas are presented
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in detail in Chapter 3. (Esteban 2012)
1.3. Research objectives
The thesis contributes to research of emotions in an attempt to provide a suit-
able and expandable model for human-computer interaction in social robotics.
The proposed emotional model is combined with the AISoy1 decision theoretic
framework that explains behaviour based on optimizing expected utility in a
multiactor environment. The thesis is inspired by theories and experimen-
tal results from psychology, neurology, economics, game theory and decision
theory as well as existing computational models. The emotional model will
include the following features and relevant theory will be reviewed:
multilevel affect: mood and discrete emotions
versatile emotion dynamics: event appraisal, mood congruency,
affective objects and motivational states
relationships through conditioning and familiarity-dependent at-
titude formation
personalities that affect emotion generation and behaviour
effect of emotions on perceiving utility
The decision model includes adaptive forecasting models that are used to
make predictions about future user actions and environment state. To sim-
plify the robot operation and to reduce computational time allowing real-time
interaction, the following features are not yet included:
learning about the utility of the user based on interaction
learning new actions and their consequences
understanding group interaction and active participants
goal selection and relevant task management for goals that can-
not be completed with a single action
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The thesis is organized in the following structure. In this Chapter, we have
introduced different implementations of emotional models and affectionate
robots, as well as defined the research objectives. In Chapter 2, the basis for
emotional models is discussed, and the relevant neurological and psychologi-
cal research is presented. Using the theories, implications for mathematical
models of emotional decision making are reviewed. Chapter 3 contains the
mathematical structure of the developed emotional decision making model,
divided in the decision making and the emotional system components, with
some recommendations for further research. Finally, the introduced model







The brain can be divided into the neocortex, the surface of the brain, and the
subcortical structures, including striatum and the brainstem. Several subcor-
tical structures relate to event reward processing, especially those involving
dopamine, and to reinforcement learning. They have connections with parts
of the frontal and temporal lobes that are also involved in valuation. The cor-
tical areas include the frontal cortex’s medial and orbital regions (the inner
surfaces and base of the frontal lobes), the amygdala (the inner surface of the
temporal lobes) and the insular cortex (the junction of the frontal and tempo-
ral lobes) which, together with their subcortical counterparts, are referred to
as the limbic system, shown in Figure 2.1. (Cohen 2005)
The limbic system is hard-wired with emotions and it is shared with other
mammals. It regulates basic functions including body temperature and drives
e.g. hunger, sleep and sex. Inside the limbic system, the thalamus receives
sensory information and contains the emotional center amygdala, which is
distributed on both sides of the brain. The limbic system normally passes
information onto the cortex where higher cognitive functioning takes place,
but it can intercept the signal by releasing catecholamine neurotransmitters
which make it possible to react quickly to threats. (McDermott 2004, Cohen
2005)
This means that emotional processing partly takes place before cognition al-
though it is important to realise that both systems are interconnected, the
15
Figure 2.1: Brain areas related to decision making, bold text indicating
areas related to emotional processing and italics to cognitive processing
(Cohen 2005)
other direction being for example event appraisal. Especially the anterior and
dorsolateral regions of prefrontal cortex, located in the upper and front most
surfaces of the frontal lobes, are involved in higher-level cognitive processes.
(McDermott 2004, Cohen 2005)
The concept of limbic system has been challenged because it has been hard
to define in terms of an exact location as emotions seem to be associated
with multiple brain areas. LeDoux (1995) reviewed neural activity related
to fear conditioning, or Pavlovian defence conditioning, where an uncondi-
tioned stimuli (US) such as pain is preceded by a conditioned stimuli (CS) e.g.
a sound. The stimuli tend to be associated only after a few pairings and the
theory states that pathways transmitting information about the stimuli in-
tersect. Research has shown that lesions of midbrain and auditory pathway’s
thalamic stations prevent conditioning, but those of auditory cortex do not,
which implies that CS exits the auditory system at thalamus level. Indeed, in
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addition to auditory cortex, thalamus projects to the amygdala and interrupt-
ing that connection also interferes with conditioning. The amygdala is crucial
for CS conditioning. (LeDoux 1995)
Contextual conditioning, which pairs the US with the background stimuli
present in the environment, is also dependent on the hippocampus. Logi-
cally, the hippocampus is involved in complex information processing. While
lateral nucleus of amygdala is needed for input capture in conditioning, the
cental nucleus is needed for its output. Lesions in the central nucleus reduce
expression of conditioned responses. Other types of fear conditioning, e.g. vi-
sual, also involve amygdala but input circuit are not as clear as for auditory
conditioning, see Figure 2.2. (LeDoux 1995)
Figure 2.2: Neural circuits of fear conditioning (LeDoux 1995)
The neurological circuits provide clues for the cognitive-emotional debate in
psychology (Zajonc 1984, Lazarus 1984). The amygdala receives input from
both the thalamus and the cortex. The thalamus link is faster but not as de-
tailed as the slower cortex link, which is needed to distuingish between stim-
uli. Inputs from hippocampal formation help to understand the context and
raise different reaction to stimuli depending on the situation. The amygdala
also sends some output to cortical sensory systems which allows emotions
to influence perceptions. Feedback to the cortex, the hippocampus and the
nucleus basalis can affect selective attention, spacial behaviour, contextual
processing, memory and more. Emotions can be affected without complex in-
formation processing in the cortex and the hippocampus, which suggests that
cognition is not a precondition for emotion. (LeDoux 1995)
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Frank & Claus (2006) developed a model based on the interaction of the basal
ganglia-dopamine (BG-DA) system and the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) in deci-
sion making. BG-DA is involved in action selection and reinforcement learn-
ing, and OFC is critical for adaptive decision making and reversal learning.
BG-DA integrates outcomes to create probability models for choices and OFC
is used to provide working memory information on the magnitudes. The neu-
ral network model successfully simulates the effects of OFC damage on de-
cision making. Wallis (2007) provides an excellent review of the functions of
OFC.
Vytal & Hamann (2010) reviewed different studies of brain activation for dis-
crete emotions. Activation likelihood estimation (ALE) was used because it al-
lowed precise comparison of activation coordinates unlike brain region meth-
ods. Happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust were found to have charac-
teristic activation patterns and their respective major regions were the right
superior temporal gyrus, the left medial frontal gyrus, the left inferior frontal
gyrus, the left amygdala, and the right insula and right inferior frontal gyrus.
Appendix A shows a figure of the activation areas for the emotions.
2.1.2. Somatic marker hypothesis
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) states that decision making is influ-
enced by marker signals created by bioregulatory, e.g. emotional, processes.
Defect in emotion leads to impaired decision making. Emotional changes are
collected in the term ’somatic state’ because they are perceived as changes in
the activity patterns of somatosensory structures. Somatic then refers to vis-
ceral and muscoskeletal aspects of the soma. SMH is based on an assumption
of a complex human decision making process, where unconcious and concious
layers interact. Cognitive operations are based on sensory information from
the cortices and depend on supportive processes such as attention, working
memory and emotion. Decision making uses dispositional information stored
in the higher-order cortices and the subcortical nuclei. (Bechara et al. 2000)
The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VM) stores dispositional linkages between
knowledge and bioregulatory states. Links are learned to associate situations
with bioregulatory states, including emotion, from past experiences. They
are called dispositional because they are able to reactivate emotions in simi-
lar situations. The generated somatic states operate as incentive signals for
option-outcome pairs in decision making situations. Figure 2.3 shows how
normal people learned about the differences between the good and bad decks
in a repeated gambling task, unlike the VM patients. Basically, the SMH
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means that linking emotional content with alternatives is vital to smart deci-
sion making. (Bechara et al. 2000)
Figure 2.3: Differences between choices of gambling decks of normal
people and VM patients (Bechara et al. 2000)
2.2. Psychological models
Scherer (2000) reviews psyhological models of emotion. He starts off by ex-
amining the definition of emotion and concludes that it is an episode of co-
ordinated changes in several components. Some restrict the components to
just subjective feelings but also physiological arousal and motor expression
are commonly included. Emotions are often thought of as relevance detectors
because they are triggered by significant events, either external or internal.
Then other affective phenomena are compared to emotion. We will return to
definitions of different types of affect in Section 2.2.2.
The major discussions in the psychology of emotions have a long history.
Plato suggested a tripartite construction for the soul including separate ar-
eas of cognition, emotion and motivation. The debate about whether the
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systems are separate and how they could be connected has been revitalized
through the cognition-emotion debate (Zajonc 1984, Lazarus 1984). In Section
2.1.1 we noted that neurological evidence suggests an interconnected system.
Descartes insisted that mental and physiological processes are examined at
the same time. There are debates on whether emotions can be recognized
with physiological patterns, and on how bodily changes affect subjective feel-
ing, but physiological effects are not very relevant when dealing with robots.
Darwin placed strong emphasis on universal expression of emotion in face,
body and voice, which anthropologists have attacked arguing for the impor-
tance of cultural effects on emotion elicitation. There seems to be significant
universality in emotions, see e.g. Ekman & Friesen (1971) and Levenson et al.
(1992), so sociocultural factors are ignored in our model. (Scherer 2000)
2.2.1. Dimensions of emotions
A central debate in the psychology of emotions is whether there are basic
emotions that can be mixed to represent other emotions or are there certain
dimensions along which all emotions can be represented. Russell & Barrett
(1999) dismiss the idea of basic emotions because the research does not con-
verge on the correct set, as pointed out by Ortony & Turner (1990) (see Ap-
pendix B), and remark that languages have different amounts of emotion cat-
egories, e.g. 7 in Chewong to 500-2000 in English. Instead, they choose a cir-
cumplex model with two bipolar dimensions used for representing core affect,
or mood. The dimensions are pleasure and arousal, and they are supported
by factor analyses. Watson, Clark & Tellegen (1988) offer a similar structure
with the dimensions positive and negative affect, which are basically a 45 de-
gree rotation of pleasure and arousal, and describe the same space. However,
for emotional episodes, more dimensions are needed. For example, anger and
fear could fall in identical places in the circumplex but additional dimensions
could distinguish them. Event appraisal (Roseman et al. 1990) can be used
for this purpose. Emotional episodes involve core affect but are complex pro-
cesses and often concerned with a specific object. The circumplex can be seen
in Figure 2.4. (Russell & Barrett 1999)
Several researchers take an opposing stand and claim that emotions can be
divided into basic categories which have separate qualities. For example fa-
cial expressions, language and brain activation methods have been popular in
categorization (Ekman & Friesen 1971, Johnson-Laird & Oatley 1989, Izard
1994, Damasio, Grabowski, Bechara, Damasio, Ponto, Parvizi & Hichwa 2000,
Phan, Wager, Taylor & Liberzon 2002). An important argument is that two-
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Figure 2.4: Russell’s two-dimensional model with discrete emotions
plotted (Russell & Barrett 1999)
dimensional bipolar models do not support mixed exclusive feelings, that is,
one cannot e.g. be happy and sad at the same time. Larsen & McGraw (2001)
showed that after watching the film Life Is Beautiful, happiness and sadness
did co-occur strongly in the participants. Table 2.1 lists studies on discrete
emotions. Happiness, sadness, anger, fear and disgust are identified in almost
all the studies. It is useful to measure the emotional state as a mix of discrete
emotions because specific emotions affect decision making in different ways
(Lerner & Keltner 2000).
It is notable that the dimensions of emotion generation, identification and ex-
pression are not necessarily the same. An emotion could be generated through
a motive-inconsistent and other-caused event, it could be identified as a mix of
anger and disgust, and it could be expressed through aggressive facial, skele-
tal, vocal and autonomous activity. Emotion identification with a circumplex
is inferior to using discrete categories, because although the latter can be
mapped to the former, it does not work the other way so well.
But how to measure emotion generation? Izard (1993) lists neural, sensori-
motor, motivational and cognitive systems as emotion activators. The neural
system is too complex to model easily, and the sensorimotor system that e.g.
associates postures with emotions is not so relevant for a robot. The motiva-
tional system includes physiological drives such as hunger and the cognitive
system is related to perception of events. Low battery level can be chosen as
a drive comparable with nutritional deprivation, or hunger, and similarly, it
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Model developer Emotions Methodology
Ekman & Friesen (1971) Happiness, Sadness, Facial expressions
Anger, Fear, Surprise,
Disgust
Levenson et al. (1992) Happiness, Sadness, Autonomous nervous
Anger, Fear, Disgust system activity
Frijda et al. (1989) Joy, Sadness, Anger, Clustering of appraisal
Fear, Surprise and action readiness
Regret, Relief, Hope components
Izard (1994) Joy, Sadness, Anger, Facial expressions
Fear, Surprise, Disgust
Shame, Interest
Ekman (1992) Happiness, Sadness, Meta-analysis
Anger, Fear, Surprise,
Disgust-Contempt
Johnson-Laird & Happiness, Sadness, Linguistic
Oatley (1989) Anger, Fear, Disgust
Damasio et al. (2000) Happiness, Sadness, Brain activity
Anger, Fear based grouping
Phan et al. (2002) (Happiness), Sadness, Brain region
(Anger), Fear, (Disgust) activation meta-ana-
lysis
Vytal & Hamann (2010) Happiness, Sadness, Activation likelihood
Anger, Fear, Disgust estimation meta-ana-
lysis
Table 2.1: Different models of discrete emotions
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will increase anger.
On the cognitive side, Roseman et al. (1990) introduced a revised version of
event appraisal. Event appraisal is based on the assumption that emotions
are activated not by events as such, but rather by their perception on several
dimensions. Empirical support was acquired for the effects of:
situational state: whether the event is motive-consistent or motive-
inconsistent
motivational state: whether the subject is appetitive for a reward
or aversive to a punishment
agency: who is responsible for the event (self, other, circumstances)
probability: how likely the event is
power: perceived degree of control over the event
legitimacy: deserving a positive or a negative outcome
The appraisal dimensions were tested in experiments where subjects were
asked to recall experiences of two given emotions and tell the stories of what
happened. Then, three questions regarding each appraisal dimension were
asked in a random order and on a 9-point scale. The results in Appendix
C show that all dimensions were significant, but probability was not as im-
portant as the other dimensions. Legitimacy was a controversial dimension
and it does not appear in Figure 2.5 which visualizes the effects of appraisal
dimensions on emotion activation.
Situational state differentiates positive emotions from negative ones. Motiva-
tional state differentiates joy and sadness from relief and disgust. The results
imply that other-agency causes surprise, liking, disgust and anger/frustration,
self-agency causes pride, shame, guilt and regret, circumstances cause hope,
relief, sadness, and all cause joy, regret and fear. The causes of surprise,
disgust, frustration, joy, relief, hope, distress, sadness and fear can be easily
attributed to self or other people, even when the events are caused by circum-
stances, as when frustration in a bad grade for a difficult course is seen as
caused by the teacher. Uncertain events elicit surprise, hope and fear, certain
events elicit joy and disgust, and both kinds of events can elicit relief. Power
is generally seen as higher in positive than negative emotions but this might
be due to feeling powerful when positive results are achieved, and it is not
necessarily a relevant dimension as it correlates with the situational state.
(Roseman et al. 1990)
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Figure 2.5: Roseman’s event appraisal model (Roseman et al. 1990)
2.2.2. Core affect, emotional events and moods
A remarkable problem in the psychology of emotions is defining affective phe-
nomena. Russell (2003) provides a framework for different levels of affect.
Core affect is the most primitive and universal conscious level of affect, or
the feeling component of other levels of affect, and it is measured on two di-
mensions; pleasure (or valence) and arousal (see Figure 2.4). It is a mental
but not a cognitive concept as its cause is not necessarily defined, it simply
is. Changes in core affect often guide attention towards their causes and like-
valenced elements, which is seen asmood congruency in cognitive processing.
Mood congruency refers to the focus of memory and other information pro-
cessing on entities with similar valence as the current core affect. Core affect
dynamics can be influenced by affect regulation actions e.g. drinking coffee to
increase arousal. People normally try to maximize pleasure with their behav-
ior and core affect is involved in motivation, reward and reinforcement. Mood
is defined as a prolonged core affect.
Another important concept is affective quality. Objects are affectively inter-
preted before they are processed in consciousness. The affective quality of
an object is a property which has the capacity to change core affect but does
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not necessarily do so. Perception of this property is an evaluation process.
Affective quality is closely related to core affect, but it requires an object.
Attributed affect links the changes in core affect to a cause or an object. Emo-
tional episodes are events that are sufficiently similar to certain emotional
categories which are defined by multi-dimensional cognitive structures, e.g.
becoming afraid or having fear when seeing a bear in the forest. Often an
antecedent event contains affective qualities that change core affect, which is
then attributed to the event. A complex appraisal follows, expressive changes
appear, subjective conscious experiences, e.g. indecision, are felt, an emo-
tional label is given to the episode and some action is taken. Emotional
episodes can be mapped to the circumplex, but the intensities vary and e.g.
Reisenzein (1994) suggested that emotions are not linear on the circumplex
with regard to their intensities. (Russell 2003)
Beedie et al. (2005) conducted a questionnaire of the distinctions between
emotion and mood as well as a review of the available academic studies.
The answers to the open-ended question "What do you believe is the differ-
ence between an emotion and a mood?" were analyzed for content. Cause,
duration and consequences are important criteria for both academics and
non-academics, but intentionality and control are emphasized more by the
academics and non-academics, respectively. The results are summarized in
Figure 2.6. Mood is considered longer lasting than emotion and having less
specific causes. Mood is seen as the result of emotions and it biases cogni-
tion while emotion biases behaviour. Non-academics mentioned having less
control over emotions, and moods being experienced in thinking and emotions
being experienced as feeling.
In this thesis, the term emotion will be used instead of emotional episodes
and mood refers to the slowly changing, emotion-integrative core affect but
not the core affect dimension of emotions.
2.2.3. Conditioning and attitudes
Sometimes the affective qualities observed in objects can raise attitudes if
they appear constantly. Then, affective perception is biased by a conditioned
emotion. Pavlov (1927) presented famous experiments on dogs where the ani-
mals showed conditioned defense reflexes for signals (conditioned stimuli, CS)
which had been associated with harmful stimuli (unconditioned stimuli, US).
He called it defense conditioning and today it is known as fear conditioning.
Conditioned responses are rather emotions that affect behaviour than direct
behaviour itself, for example in response to an object that is associated with
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Figure 2.6: Comparison of distinctions between emotion and mood
(Beedie et al. 2005)
joyful experiences, a subject would feel more happy instead of just acting in a
specific happy manner. The neural basis for fear conditioning was reviewed
in Section 2.1.1. (LeDoux 1995)
Attitudes can be understood as evaluative tendencies for affective qualities.
Several studies have shown that conditioning can have effects on attitudes,
e.g. Olson & Fazio (2001) proved that pairing positive and negative words
with Pokemon names affected the valence ratings of the characters. Also sub-
liminal stimulus have been observed to affect evaluation which suggests that
unconcious conditioning is effective for attitudes. The results of Öhman &
Soares (1998) suggest that we are more prepared to make unconcious condi-
tions for US-CS pairs with evolutionary or cognitive basis, e.g. a shock can
be conditioned unconciously with spiders but not with flowers. Often attitude
also changes through evaluative association which differs from classical con-
ditioning in that the US and CS are presented at the same time. This kind
of association endures even if the CS appears without the US, which usually
leads to extinction in classical conditioning. Attitudes can be drawn from as-
sociated stereotypes when individuals are seen as part of a group that has
been attributed with affective qualities. As well as affecting the evaluation of
events, attitudes can elicit emotions. (Clore & Schnall 2005)
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2.2.4. Expectations and alternatives
Situational state, or motive-consistency, of events is often measured in com-
putational models through utility. Decision Affect Theory (DAT) (Mellers
et al. 1997), FLAME (El-Nasr et al. 2000) and EMA (Gratch & Marsella 2004)
are examples of this approach. The higher the utility of an event, measured
with several criteria, the higher the motive-consistency. However, perception
of motive-consistency is also affected by expectations of what should happen
and alternative scenarios. Roboceptionist (Kirby et al. 2010) changes its mood
according to not only the present situation, but to memories of past events
and expectations of future events too. The uncertainty dimension of Roseman
et al. (1990) is specifically related to future events, which cause surprise, hope
and fear. The current visceral state, which refers to the mix of emotional and
drive states, affects perceptions more than remembered or expected states
because people are bad at imagining how they would value options in other
states (Loewenstein 2000).
Other alternatives are powerful in changing perceptions of a decision prob-
lem. Winning zero in a gamble can elicit both positive and negative emo-
tions if the other outcomes would have been negative or positive (Mellers
et al. 1997). This suggests that utility is perceived as relative rather than
absolute.
2.2.5. Personality traits for diverse dynamics
People are very different in terms of behaviour, feeling and thinking but usu-
ally some enduring and similar patterns can be recognized which are called a
personality. Properties of a personality, or personality traits, can be described
with factor models. The most common one has five factors and it is called The
Big Five or OCEAN which stands for Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraver-
sion, Agreeableness and Neuroticism. The factors correlate with groups of
properties in Table 2.2. The Big Five is consistent across cultures and works
as a framework for also abnormal personalities. Other factor models with
two to five factors have been proposed and examining them reveals the hier-
archical structure of the factors. Figure 2.7 shows correlations between the
different factors. (McCrae & P. T. Costa 1997, Markon et al. 2005)
Personalities are important for emotional models because they affect the dy-
namics of emotion activation together with mood. There are differences in
average level, variability, activation and intensity of emotions. For example
the TAME model uses personalities in activation functions (Moshkina 2006).
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Figure 2.7: Markon’s structural model of personalities, N=Neuroticism,
A=Agreeableness, C=Concentiousness, E=Extraversion, O=Openness
(Markon et al. 2005)
Studies have found different and sometimes contradictory results for the ef-
fects when personality and mood have been examined separately, but instead
of this traditional approach, moderation and mediation frameworks seem
functional. In moderation, personalities and moods interact in influencing
emotional processing, and in mediation, personality traits guide toward spe-
cific emotions and moods that influence emotional processing. Most impor-
tantly, neuroticism is connected to higher intensities and variation as well as
tendency towards negative-valenced emotions whereas extraversion is related
to positive-valenced emotions. (Rusting 1998, Eid 1999)
Openness Conscienti- Extraversion Agreeableness Neuroticism
ousness
Fantasy, Competence, Warmth, Trust, Anxiety,
Aesthetics, Order, Gregariousness, Modesty, Impulsiveness,
Feelings, Dutifulness, Assertiveness, Altruism, Depression,
Actions, Deliberation, Activity, Compliance, Vulnerability,
Ideas, Self- Excitement Straight- Angry
Discipline, Seeking, forwardness, Hostility,
Values Achievement Positive Tender- Self-
Striving Emotions Mindedness Consciousness
Table 2.2: Correlates of personality factors (McCrae & P. T. Costa 1997)
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Following the mediation approach, personality traits make people more sensi-
tive to certain emotional events. Eid (1999) conducted an experiment on how
personalities affect the variability of discrete emotions. The results in Fig-
ure 2.8 show that neuroticism was significantly correlated with mean levels
and standard deviations of all negative (positive correlation) and almost all
positive (negative correlation) emotions. Extraversion significantly affected
mean levels of all but love and had positive correlation for both mean levels
and standard deviations of positive emotions and vice versa for negative emo-
tions. Agreeableness was associated with higher mean love and happiness
as well as lower anger and sadness. Openness did not affect anything and
conscientiousness only correlated with higher levels of happiness.
Figure 2.8: Correlations between personality and mean level and stan-
dard deviation of emotions (Eid 1999)
Heller (1993) proposed a model linking personality with affect dimensions
based on brain activity. Neuroticism is associated with low pleasantness as
high activation and extraversion is associated with high pleasantness and
high activation. Low neuroticism is often called emotional stability and low
extraversion is called introversion, and they have opposite associations as
shown in Figure 2.9. Schmidtke & Heller (2004) tested emotional brain acti-
vation of different personalities with electroencephalography (EEG) and con-
cluded that the results, together with cited research, supported the model. It
can be argued that a neurotic person would be more biased towards anger
than sadness and an extroverted person more towards joy than happiness
because activation is higher in anger and joy than in sadness and happiness.
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Figure 2.9: The circumplex structure of personality by Heller (1993)
(Schmidtke & Heller 2004)
Kuppens et al. (2010) developed a dynamic stochastic differential equation
model, DynAffect, for affect dynamics in the circumplex. They based their
model on individual differences in affective variability and a homebase with
an attractor strenght. The empirical data was fitted with the model which
provided similar affect patterns as the subjects. Several variables were ex-
amined regarding their effect on the parameters: self-esteem, neuroticism,
extraversion, normal positive and negative affect, satisfaction with life, reap-
praisal, suppression and rumination. The correlations can be seen in Fig-
ure 2.10. The average homebase had slightly positive pleasure and arousal,
and high neuroticism moved it towards higher arousal and lower pleasure,
whereas extraversion only moved it significantly towards higher pleasure.
Figure 2.10: DynAffect model correlations between dispositions and
parameters with p-values in parentheses (Kuppens et al. 2010)
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2.2.6. Human needs and subjective well-being
What motivates humans in their behavior? Maslow (1943) introduced a hier-
archy for human needs that guides behavior. It is organized in ranked goal
classes and prior needs must be satisfied before concentrating on a new goal
although many needs can motivate behavior simultaneously. Humans seek to




















The model was developed for individual motivation and it has received both
support (Wicker, Brown, Wiehe, Hagen & Reed 1993) and criticism (Hofstede
1984). Hagerty (1999) applied the model to nations’ Quality of Life (QOL) by
using approximate measures the human needs, e.g. daily calories and Gross
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Domestic Product (GDP) for physiological needs. Results mostly confirmed
the theory but external conditions such as environmental health or poverty in
society are not considered well enough by the theory.
Subjective Well-Being (SWB) is another concept for understanding QOL, rely-
ing on subjective perception. Often the research concentrates on correlates of
happiness which is mostly measured with life satisfaction, positive and neg-
ative emotions. Diener, Suh, Lucas & Smith (1999) reviewed the research on
SWB and concluded that input variables affect the components differentially.
Interestingly, on a national scale, income did not affect SWB significantly. Tay
& Diener (2011) conducted a large-scale international review on SWB in var-
ious cultures. They tested the effects of several needs on life evaluation, pos-
itive and negative feelings. The needs were close to the hierarchy of Maslow
(1943): Basic needs for food and shelter, Safety and security, Social support
and love, Feeling respected and pride in activities, Mastery, Self-direction and
autonomy, and Log income. Basic needs were the most influential predictor
for life evaluation and they were partly explained by income, since income did
not affect positive or negative feelings as it did life evaluation. The results
supported Maslow in that basic and safety needs are often satisfied before
other needs but they also showed that well-being can be enhanced with psy-
chological needs even if basic needs are not met.
2.3. Emotions in economics
Economics has seen waves of trends and theories. It started out with classi-
cal economics and Adam Smith’s model for self-interest and division of labor.
Early theories were motivated by the effect of environment on behavior. Later
Keynes’ theory became widely used as it provided tools for economic manage-
ment based on psychological concepts of behavior. Then came neoclassical
economics with Samuelson’s revealed preference model, which was based on
strongly normative axioms for choice. Morgenstern and von Neumann cre-
ated the concept of expected utility (EU) maximization and game theory for
multiple actors. EU provided a useful framework for decision making. Soon,
however, evidence became to amount against axioms and EU models in real
behavior. Friedman supported neoclassical models claiming that even if the
underlying behavioral theories were wrong, the models’ predictions could still
be true in an approximate sense. Morgenstern concluded that EU was appli-
cable in a limited domain. (Glimcher, Camerer, Fehr & Poldrack 2008, Ch.
1)
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However, research evolved into a fresh direction. The Allais paradox in which
serial pairwise choices led to a revealed preference which violated the inde-
pendence axiom of EU, and psychological experiments where the "framing"
effect showed that choice is dependent on the description of alternatives, gave
birth to behavioral economics. The idea was to use psychological evidence to
improve neoclassical theories. Kahneman and Tversky were pioneers creating
prospect theory for the effect of references on choice. Observations of choice
were anticipated to produce heuristics for statistical models and social pref-
erence theories to add the impact of other people’s values on choice. Experi-
mental economists such as Plott and Smith were more interested in finding
global rules for economics using methods from psychology for experiments
as opposed to using psychological principles to enhance models. (Glimcher
et al. 2008, Ch. 1)
Neuroeconomics was founded because of the need to get new evidence on in-
formation processing mechanisms in humans. Brain research could bring new
knowledge to enhance algorithms developed by behavioral economists. Neu-
roeconomists were split between two approaches; the behavioral economic,
using economic theory to develop choice algorithms, and the neuroscientific,
trying to improve neoclassical models with new research with neurological
tools. Neuroscientific behavior is studied with physiological models which
aim at correlating physiological signals, or changes in biological states, with
behavior but the experiments are slow and often destructive. Another way
is to use neurological methods. Neurological research concentrated on the ef-
fects of brain damage on behavior. Brain damage was known to affect also
mental states, but they were harder to observe and were largely ignored. Sig-
nal detection theory provided a way to relate brain activity with behavior.
Research with stochastic monkey choices suggested the use of psychometric-
neurometric match, a correlation between behavior and neural activity, al-
though it did not seem to suit all brain areas. An expected utility theory based
on brain stimulation of rats and Herrnstein’s matching law was proposed, nor-
malizing utility with regard to other alternatives. (Glimcher et al. 2008, Ch.
1)
Later non-invasive techniques for brain imaging, funtional magnetic reso-
nance imaging (fMRI), and for brain stimulation, transcranial magnetic stim-
ulation (TMS) and transcranial direct current stimulation (tDCS), have given
interesting results because now also mental functions could be studied. fMRI
was widely used to examine brain activity in cognitive tasks. An increasing
amount of neuropeptide oxytocin was observed to alter behavior differently in
human and nonhuman interaction for a trust game which implied that people
have different mechanisms for social choice. The disruption of only the right
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side of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) was shown to increase the
acceptance of unfair offers in the ultimatum game even though both sides of
the DLPFC are activated during the game. Brain imaging and stimulation
can lead to understanding causal mechanisms. (Glimcher et al. 2008, Ch. 1)
There has been a growing interest in the role of emotion in economics as new
research has highlighted its role in economic decisions. An important notion
is that subjective experience, or feeling, is not necessary for emotions to be
present. That is, we do not always know that our emotions are affecting our
decisions. A problem in introducing the effect of emotions on decision making
in economics is how definitions are used. Consumer preferences and value
are compared to emotional responses to events and attitudes toward affective
objects. Preferences are understood as long-lasting liking or disliking that
are connected to emotional states in consumer research. Affect dispositions
are described as enduring traits that could be compared to personality traits
in psychology. In decision theory, preferences refer to personal utility func-
tion weights and shapes, and risk attitudes. (Glimcher et al. 2008, Ch. 16),
(Clemen 1996)
2.4. Connection with game theory
Emotions are closely connected with game theory as was mentioned in the
previous section. Expected utility (EU) maximization hypothesis and many
axioms have been proved to be descriptively invalid. Probably the clearest
example is the ultimatum game. In stage one, the first participant makes
an offer of splitting a given amount of money between her and the other par-
ticipant; in stage two the other participant either accepts or rejects the of-
fer. If the offer is rejected, neither participant gets anything. According to
utility maximization, using monetary gain as the single criterion, the first
player should offer the smallest possible amount and the second should ac-
cept it, however, unfair offers which are less than 20% are mostly rejected. Of
course, adding other criteria might overcome the problem. Sanfey et al. (2003)
found that unfair offers increased brain activity in areas related to both cog-
nition and negative emotions, specifically anger and disgust. (Camerer &
Thaler 1995)
The dictator game is a simplified version of the ultimatum game where the
first player (the dictator) has all the power and second player (the recipient)
does not have a choice to reject. Even in this game the average give ratio is
28%. Different experiment environments affect the distribution but zero of-
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P1 n P2 C D
C 2,2 0,3
D 3,0 1,1
Table 2.3: The utilities in prisoner’s dilemma, utility pairs a,b repre-
senting the utilities of player 1 (P1) and player 2 (P2), respectively
fers are very rare. The individual give distribution has spikes in 0-9%, 45-54%
and 91-100% segments. Old age increases, and the perception of deserving a
reward decreases, the give rate the most. Probably giving elicits positive emo-
tions which are regarded as beneficial. (Engel 2010)
In the prisoner’s dilemma, two players decide whether they will co-operate
(C) or defect (D) without knowing each others’ actions. Each player has an
incentive to defect regardless of the other player’s choice but if both players
defect, they will get less than otherwise, as shown in Table 2.3. This situation
gives an equilibrium of both defecting. In a repeated game some strategies can
lead to a co-operation equilibrium. In practice the choice is not always clear,
as when one player knows that the other has defected but is feeling empathy
towards her and decides to co-operate even though it is against self-interest.
(Batson & Ahmad 2001)
The trust game is in a way the opposite of the ultimatum game. A truster
can send part of a given amount of money to a trustee and that money is
then multiplied and the trustee can return part of the money. According to
game theory, the truster shouldn’t give anything. Berg, Dickhaut & McCabe
(1995) found that the trusters sent over 50% on average in a simple design,
and based on various experiments they concluded that reciprocity is a basic
human element. Engle-Warnick & Slonim (2004) showed that in repeated
games experienced players did give less when the relationships were definite
compared to indefinite relationships. Delgado, Frank & Phelps (2005) stud-
ied brain activation in trusters with given perceptions of trustees (good, bad,
neutral) and noticed that the trusters made riskier choices with good trustees.
Also, the repeated games and feedback were much more efficient for learning
about a neutral than a good or bad trustee.
For multiple players, public good games are another example where catego-
rization of humans into types clarifies the setting. In them, the players can
choose howmuch they want to invest in the public goods that benefit everyone
and how much on themselves. The players can be divided in three types: i)
cooperators, who focus on investing in public goods, ii) free-riders, who invest
in themselves, and iii) reciprocators, who use a strategy conditional on beliefs
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about the distribution of types. The population as a whole is a stable poly-
morhic equilibrium of types, probably due to evolutionary and social causes.
The public goods contributions are then affected by compositions of the groups
in which the games are played. (Kurzban & Houser 2005, Gunnthorsdottir,
Houser & McCabe 2007)
One suggestion for making EU work in these contexts is the introduction of
types and beliefs about them. Every type of individual is assumed to use a
certain strategy and beliefs on the distribution of types in the group affect the
optimal choice. These beliefs are affected by emotions. (Glimcher et al. 2008,
Ch. 5)
2.5. Effect of emotions on decisions
Affect influences judgement diversely. For example, happy audiences feel
more positive about presented messages, fearful people perceive also other
people as more fearful and depression causes decreased attraction to others.
The Affect Infusion Model (AIM) seeks to explain mood influences on social
judgements. Often the effects are related to mood congruency e.g. selective
attention. Affect has significant weight when heuristic processing is used in
the judgements. Unfamiliarity, simplicity, personal relevance, low motiva-
tion, low cognitive capacity and positive affect lead to heuristic processing
and high affect infusion which refers to the effect of emotion on judgement.
(Forgas 1995)
Schwarz (2000) reviewed effects of emotions on decisions and noted that happy
people engage in heuristic and sad people in systematic processing strategies,
confirmed by de Vries, Holland & Witteman (2008). The heuristic and sys-
tematic processing strategies can be compared to the System 1 and System 2
thinking modes of Kahneman (2011). Happy people are also more imitative
in multiplayer games whereas sadness evokes analysis. Pham (2007) notes
that angry and disgusted people also use heuristic processing which suggests
that the valence dimension is not the only predictor of evaluation strategy.
Tiedens & Linton (2001) claimed that the certainty dimension of appraisal is
important in determining the processing strategy, e.g. uncertainty-induced
fear promotes analytic processing, unlike disgust. Anticipated regret and
disappointment influence decisions when future emotions are predicted but
unfortunately predictions are often biased by the current affect status. Af-
fect influences are larger when the affect attributed to a specific object rather
than to chance. Another observation was that for past experience, the peak
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intensities and ending affects were much more significant than the duration.
(Schwarz 2000)
Decisions can be based on maximizing not the expected utility (EU), but the
anticipated positive emotions or valence instead. Both immediate and ex-
pected emotions then influence decisions. Future utilities are discounted
hyperbolically in the optimization of behavior. The immediate emotions, to-
gether with the other visceral factors, influence perceptions of risks and util-
ities as well as the criteria preferences. Loewenstein (1996) implies that the
criteria weights are dependent on the visceral state. Drive states can domi-
nate emotions in action selections. For example, very hungry people tend to fo-
cus on getting food regardless of being angry or happy. Tversky & Kahneman
(1992) developed Prospect Theory to explain the anomalities of EU. They use
nonlinear weighting functions for probabilities, as seen in Figure 2.11, and
value functions which are convex below the reference point (negatively per-
ceived outcomes) and concave above it, where the value functions are steeper
for losses than for gains. (Loewenstein 2000, Loewenstein & Lerner 2003)
Figure 2.11: Probability weighting function inspired by Tversky &
Kahneman (1992) (Loewenstein & Lerner 2003)
Lerner & Keltner (2000) argued that the effects of discrete emotions on de-
cisions should be inspected rather than only considering the valence of the
emotions. They chose to use an appraisal-tendency approach where certain
event appraisal dimensions are used as the drivers of emotion perception ef-
fects, depending on the nature of the event. For example, anger and fear
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that are both negative emotions, can affect risk perception in opposite ways.
Especially in events that are ambiguous with regard to certainty and con-
trollability, the effects of anger are similar to those of happiness while oth-
erwise they are closer to those of fear (Lerner & Keltner 2001). Anderson &
Galinsky (2006) support the claim that power has an effect on risk-taking.
Raghunathan & Pham (1999) concluded that there are different effects for
also anxiety (close to fear) and sadness. They proposed that sadness biases to-
ward high-risk/high-reward options and anxiety toward low-risk/low-reward
options because the goals are reward acquisition for sadness and control ac-
cretion for anxiety. Fessler, Pillsworth & Flamson (2004) took an evolutionary
approach and found sex differences in risk taking for anger and disgust. They
hypothesized that men are more risk-seeking in an angry state and women
more so in a disgusted state because the emotions are associated with protect-
ing reproductive interests. Risk behavior did not change when the emotions
were in reverse order for the sexes and the effects decrease with age. The
results of the studies are summarized in Table 2.4. The effect magnitudes are
mostly related to emotion intensities.
Emotion Risk perception Processing strategy
Happiness Optimistic Heuristic
Anger Optimistic when an ambiguous event Heuristic
or male, pessimistic otherwise
Disgust Optimistic if female Heuristic
Sadness Optimistic Analytic
Fear Pessimistic Analytic
Table 2.4: The effects of discrete emotions on risk perception
The observation that different emotions increase the use of heuristic or ana-
lytic processing strategies could suggest that various frameworks are needed
for behavior selection. Decision theory is useful as an analytic environment
but for heuristic processing, we would need something similar to somatic
markers (Bechara et al. 2000) that intuitively point at the best action. El-Nasr
et al. (2000) and Cattinelli, Goldwurm & Borghese (2008) used Q-learning in
their model. It associates each (state,action) -pair with a number that reflects







The decision model uses multi-attribute utilities and adaptive probability
models to choose robot actions according to expected utility. Model averag-
ing is used to combine results and the different users (human interaction
partners) are taken into account. The model is based on Esteban (2012).
3.1.1. Framework and sets
Agent A is controlled by the model and multiple human users B1; : : : ; Br 2 Bu
interact with A. The interaction takes place within an environment E. A has
a finite action set A = fa1; : : : ; amg and the users Bu have another action set
B = fb1; : : : ; bng, shown in Table 3.1. The environment E, which is common to
the agent and the users, has dynamic states within a set E . The environment
states are both internal and external, e.g. simulated pain and temperature.
A cry, alert, warn, ask for help, salute, play, speak, ask for playing,
ask for charging, ask for shutting down, tell jokes, tell stories,
tell events, obey, do nothing
B recharge, stroke, flatter, attack, offend, move, update, speak, play,
order, ignore, do nothing
Table 3.1: The action sets for the robot and the users
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A has q sensors to read both internal and external states. Sensor readings
are made at times t and the sensor reading vector is st = (s1t ; : : : ; s
q
t ). The
agent interprets the environment state vector et with a possibly probabilistic
function f :
e^t = f(st):
A assesses the probabilities of the users interacting with it with function h
B^tu = h(st):
A also evaluates the actions of users with a possibly probabilistic function g
b^t = g(st):
In short, A uses sensors st to recognize users Bu, interpret the state et and as-
sess the users’ actions bt. Then the forecasting model is updated with the new
information. The forecasting model is used in calculating expected utilities
for different actions.
3.1.2. Forecasting models
The agent has a forecasting model for evaluating probabilities for future user
actions and environment development using past actions of users and the
agent (also current action for agent), and the evolution of the environment
(et 1; at 1; bt 1).
The agent has a limited memory, in this case two steps. For each user Btu, the
probabilities of current scenarios are calculated as
p(et; bt j at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2); Btu) =
p(etjbt; at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2); Btu)
p(btjat; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2); Btu):
(3.1)
The first term is called the environment forecasting model. The external en-
vironment is partially controlled by the users and not by the agent. For ex-
ample, the users control the lighting and the temperature of a room but not
outside. In any case they can plug in the bot for charging. Only the latest
user actions can affect the evolution of the environment. We use
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p(et j bt; at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2); Btu) = p(et j bt;et 1;et 2): (3.2)
The second term is called the user forecasting model and is used for evaluating
probabilities of the current user actions. The probabilities are assessed using
historical actions and the current agent action as follows
p(bt j at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2); Btu) = p(bt j at; bt 1; bt 2; Btu): (3.3)
The equation is divided into two independent models which give possibly dif-
fering evaluations. The first model uses historical user actions to utilize action
patterns
p(bt j bt 1; bt 2; Btu): (3.4)
The second model uses the current agent action to explain the user action as
a response
p(bt j at; Btu): (3.5)
Combining the models using model averaging (Hoeting, Madigan, Raftery &
Volinsky 1999) gives
p(bt j at; bt 1; bt 2; Btu) ="




where p(Mi j Btu) is the probability of forecasting model Mi usage for Btu and
p(M1 j Btu) + p(M2 j Btu) = 1; p(Mi j Btu)  0. The probabilities describe
the action mentality of the user and more models could be used to capture
different effects.
The complete forecasting model becomes
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p(et; bt j at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2)) =X
u
"




Conditional probabilities are used to forecast m steps ahead. For example,
two steps is
p((et+1; bt+1); (et; bt) j at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2)) =
p((et+1; bt+1) j at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2); (et; bt))
p(et; bt j at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1); (et 2; at 2; bt 2)) =X
u
"











The agent maximizes the expected utility r steps ahead by choosing its ac-
tions. Expected utility for an action strategy is
max
(at;:::;at+r)









p((bt;et); : : : ; (bt+r;et+r) j (at; at+1; : : : ; at+r; (at 1; bt 1;et 1); (at 2; bt 2;et 2))):
(3.9)
This can be solved through dynamic programming with Bellman’s equation
(Bellman 1957). The utility function can be modified to direct the agent to-
ward a desired state using u(c)   (c; c) where  is a distance to the ideal
consequence value c. To make the agent less predictable, action probabilities
proportional to the power function of expected utilities can be used
P (at) /  (at)cf ; (3.10)
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where P (at) is the probability of choosing at and cf is the consistency factor of
the agent.
3.1.4. Objectives and utilities
The robot has five caterogies of objectives: being charged, being secure, being
taken into account, being accepted and being updated. These are compara-
ble with the basic human objectives of Maslow (1943), presented in Section
2.2.6. More weight is given to the objectives at the bottom of the pyramid, but
visceral state affects the weighting, as we shall describe.
Figure 3.1: The objectives pyramid (Esteban 2012)
The utilities depend on the actions and the environment. The rules for in-
ferring actions and interpreting the environment, as well as the forecasting
models, model averaging and the utility functions are explained in more detail
in Esteban (2012). This work concentrates on the emotional model explained
in next section.
3.2. Emotional model
The affect model is constructed as six dynamic variables and two static lev-
els, and it is summarized in Appendix D. The dynamic variables are a four-
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dimensional mixed discrete emotions intensity vector emt, and the two-dimen-
sional vectors; the physical condition vector pct which is a subset of the en-
vironmental state, the visceral state vst which combines emotions and the
physical condition, the visceral core affect cavst , the mood vector mdt and the
attitude vector att. The static levels are the five factor personality vector per
and the two-dimensional mood baselinemb.
The emotions are a subset of basic emotions discussed in Section 2.2.1, the
physical condition is a state vector observed with sensors and simulated for
pain, Loewenstein (1996) provides a background for the visceral factors, the
core affect and the mood are adapted from Russell (2003), and the attitude
(see Section 2.2.3) refers to the dynamic attitude towards the user with whom
the interaction takes place. The Big Five model (McCrae & P. T. Costa 1997) is
used for personality, and the mood baseline is inspired by Schmidtke & Heller
(2004) and Kuppens et al. (2010). It has positive pleasure and arousal values
by default and it is affected by Extraversion and Neurotism dimensions of
personality. We will describe the variables in the following Sections. emt,
pct, vst, per 2 [0; 1] and cavst , mdt, att, mb 2 [ 1; 1]. The dimensions of the
variables are
emt = (Happiness; Anger; Sadness; Fear)
pct = (Battery deficiency; Pain)  et
vst = emt [ pct
cavst = (Pleasure (visceral); Activation (visceral))
mdt = (Pleasure (mood); Activation (mood))
att = (Pleasure (attitude); Activation (attitude))
per = (Openness; Concentiousness; Extraversion;Agreeableness;Neurotism)
mb = (Pleasure (baseline); Activation (baseline)) :
3.2.1. Mood
Mood can be understood as a weighted, discounted integral of emotions be-
cause it captures the feelings left by past emotions, but focuses on the most
recent ones. It moves towards the baseline which is mostly determined by
personality. Also the physical condition and the attitude affect mood. It is
necessary to transform the visceral state into a two-dimensional mood rating.
Temperature, noise or light are not considered, but they could be added too.
A core affect mapping Mca(i) gives the (Pleasure, Activation) coordinates for
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each state i. The core affect mappings are estimated from Figure 2.4 and they
are shown below in Table 3.2. Only the arousal dimension of mood is used for




vs2vst wvs  vst  (vst Mca(vs)) + watattP
vs2vst wvs  vst + wat
; (3.11)
where wvs and wat are the core affect weights for the visceral factors and the
attitude, respectively.
The mappings are weighted with the visceral intensities in addition to weight-
ing with a normalized product of assigned weights and intensities. This al-
lows us to both scale the area in which the core affect is and weigh the factors
according to intensities. The weights can be modified to focus more on areas
that are lacking important factors. For example, there is only one positive
emotion and three negative ones, so happiness could be weighted more than
the other emotions. See Figure 3.2. The dynamic mood model is
mdt = mdt mdt 1 + vst cavst + mbt mb; (3.12)
where mdt , vst and mbt are the normalized weights for the previous mood,
visceral core affect and baseline, respectively.
The weights for mood dynamics are determined by visceral values vsit and
thresholds vsimd, the distance between the previous mood and the visceral
core affect Dmd;ca, and time since last mood model update Tmdu. The ratio
between previous mood and the visceral core affect is directly proportional to
the distance because mood congruency prevents very different emotions from
affecting the mood a lot, and inversely proportional to the update time be-
cause if the model is updated often, the mood movements should not be as







Table 3.2: Core Affect mappings
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Figure 3.2: An example of a core affect calculation with intensities
vst = [0:1; 0:1; 0:3; 1; 0:5; 1], weights wvs = [2; 1; 1; 2; 0:5; 0:5] and attitude
att = (0:5; 0:2) with a weight wat = 0:5
big. If the emotional core affect weight is zero, it is replaced with the mood
baseline as shown below. The ratio between the emotional core affect and the
mood baseline is proportional to the maximum difference between a visceral
value and the mood change activation threshold of that factor because when
no emotions are very intense (none or minor external events), they do not af-
fect the mood which then starts to go towards the baseline due to internal
events. The parameters are
Dx;y = jjx  yjj2





























where Dx;y is the Euclidean 2-norm distance between x and y, Idmax is the
maximum intensity difference, Tmdu is the mood model update time, atmd is
the threshold of attitude and vsimd is the threshold of visceral factor i for influ-
ence on mood, mdt is the previous mood weight, vst is the visceral core affect
weight, mbt is the mood baseline weight, Aij is the ratio strength parameter
for variables i and j.
The normalization of weights ensures that the new mood is inside the core af-
fect circumplex, as long as the initial mood, the mood baseline and the visceral
core affect are inside it. The model update time should be small enough to be
able to capture the effects of new events that cause emotions. An example of




Figure 3.3: An example of a mood change
3.2.2. Emotions
Emotions are generated by action events as well as the physical condition.
Memories of past events affect judgement and expectetations of future events
are shaped by them. The physical condition is the source of drives that also
influence behavior, or action selections, directly. For the robot, the physi-
cal condition is comprised of simulated pain, temperature and battery level.
Pain occurs when the robot is being hit and elicits anger. A high amount of
pain causes the robot to ask for help and attempt to change its place. The
external temperature and the battery level are measured with sensors. A
bad temperature and low battery level elicit sadness. Events are appraised
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according to Roseman et al. (1990). Motive-consistency is measured with util-
ity and expected utility, appetitive or aversive motivation is chosen accord-
ing to that utility, certainty is based on a standard deviation risk measure,
and agency depends on whether the appraisal takes place after the agent’s
(self/circumstances) or the user’s (other/circumstances) turn. Other-agency is
only observed in certain events which limits the scope of anger to those events.
Gratch et al. (2009) reviewed different utility-based discrete emotion inten-
sity models. The models were divided in expected utility, expectation-change,
threshold, additive and hybrid models. Expected utility models are of form
Iem = a Up P q + b, expectation-change models Iem = a Up P q + b, threshold
models Iem = a Up P q+b, if c  P  d, additive models Iem = a Up+b P q, and
hybrid models a mixture of these types. U is the subjective utility and P is the
subjective probability of winning, and P is a probability change within a pe-
riod. They tested the different models by experimenting with games of Battle-
ship where the subjects could win or lose money. The game was played against
a confederate who saw the subjects’ positions and could manipulate the game
to alter perceptions of winning. The subjects thought that they were play-
ing against each other. The subjective evaluations of winning probabilities,
utilities and emotional intensities were recorded at three points. Strongest
support was received for the expected utility model, and all the other models
except the additive were judged insignificant.
The problem in the article was that framing the game as winning or losing
was not effective, probably because the subjects anyway felt they were gain-
ing something (the experiment fee). Negative outcomes then were not consid-
ered properly, as a highly probable small utility scenario elicited less sadness
than a less probable small utility scenario. That is, even scenarios with bad
utility are wanted to be probable, and only probabilities and utilities related
to positive goal attainment are modeled.
In our model, there are several possible outcomes through a user reaction to
the robot’s behavior. When an action at is selected, there are valid outcome
estimates u^t = u(at; bt;et) with probabilities p^t = p(et; bt j at; (et 1; at 1; bt 1);
(et 2; at 2; bt 2)). The expected outcome utility and respective modified stan-

















p^t  (u^t   U^t)2: (3.18)
These measures can be used to calculate emotional content for the motive-
inconsistent emotions fear (aversive: low utility and low positive variation /
appetitive: high utility and high negative variation) and sadness (appetitive:
high utility and high negative variation) prior to the user reaction (t ). The
expected emotional contents for time t are
ecfeart  =
8><>:
afearec   (1  U^t)  (1  +U^t) + b
fear
ec  if U^t < U^
fear
low
afearec   U^t   U^t + b
fear







asadnessec   U^t   U^t + b
sadness
ec  if U^t > U^ sadnesshigh
0 else;
(3.20)
where ecemt  is the expected emotional content of emotion em, and aemec  and bemec 
are the affine function parameters for it.
When the user reacts with action bt, the obtained utility ut = u(at; bt;et) can
be compared to the expectation, and a disappointment measure, similar to
the Decision Affect Theory (DAT) of Mellers et al. (1997), is constructed. The
measure is
dpt = (1  p^t)  df(ut   U^t) (3.21)
df(x) =
(
xkp if x  0
  xkn if x < 0; (3.22)
where dpt is the disappointment measure, p^t is the latest probability estimate
for the occurred event with the utility ut and df() is the disappointment func-
tion that has parameters kp and kn for positive and negative differences, re-
spectively.
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Now emotional content for happiness (high utility or positive surprise), anger
(low utility or negative surprise), sadness (low utility) and fear (under attack)
can be calculated as follows
echappinesst = a
happiness
ec  (ut + dpt) + bhappinessec (3.23)
ecangert = a
anger
ec  (1  (ut + dpt)) + bangerec (3.24)
ecsadnesst =
(
asadnessec  (1  ut) + bsadnessec if U^t > U^ sadnesshigh
0 else
(3.25)
ecfeart = min (1; ec
fear






) ecit 2 [0; 1] 8i;
where ecemt is the emotional content of emotion em, aemec  and bemec  are the affine
function parameters for it, and U^ sadnesshigh is the utility threshold for experiencing
sadness.
Emotional content causes emotion intensities depending on the mood and per-
sonality. The TAME model (Moshkina 2006) introduces an intensity function,
shown in Equation 1.3. We use core affect distances between the mood and
the emotions, as well as the personality-emotion mappings Mpe(i; j) shown in
Table 3.3, to form a similar, dynamic growth function
Emotion n Personality O C E A N
Happiness 1 0 1 1 0
Sadness 1 0 0 0 1
Anger 1 0 0 -1 1
Fear 1 0 0 0 1




















perj Mpe(i; j) (3.29)





perj Mpe(i; j) (3.30)
where emit is emotion intensity, NMpe 6=0 is the amount of nonzero personality-
emotion mappings for emotion i, ecit is the emotional content, apit controls the
activation point, gri controls the maximum slope, and pvi is the peak value.
With a personality per = (1; 0; 0; 1; 0) and a mood mdt = ( 0:98; 0:19), the
parameters for happiness would be pvhappiness = min (1; 0:7 + 0:5
3

(1  1 + 0  1 + 1  1)) = 1, grhappiness = 4 + 9
3
 (1  1 + 0  1 + 1  1) = 10 and
aphappinesst = 6 + 10  2   53  (1  1 + 0  1 + 1  1) = 2223 . Examples of intensity
functions can be seen in Figure 3.4. Emotions are instantaneous and they are
evaluated according to action events, i.e. after the robot’s action at and after
the user’s action bt. The jumps can be smoothened with additional dynamics
if the situation requires it.
Figure 3.4: Emotion intensity function examples
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3.2.3. Attitude
The user-specific attitude represents the emotional aspect of the relationship.
A familiarity measure, adapted from Kirby et al. (2010), is used in updating
perceptions of existing users and in memory allocation for new users. The
more familiar a person is, the less weight is given to new data and the more
likely that the user is remembered. Also the Openness dimension of person-
ality affects the updating. A default attitude profile is used for unrecognized
users before there is enough data to develop an attitude towards them. The
default profile is based on first interactions with unrecognized people. At-
titude is formed through conditioning, i.e. the emotions that are associated





















att(def) = wat;oldt  att 1(def) + wat;newt  cavst if inttot(cur) < 2 (3.33)










where famBut is the familiarity measure, inttot(Bu) and intprev(Bu) are the total
(hours) time of and the time since the previous (days) interaction with the user
Bu, cur refers to the most probable current user, att(def) and att(Bu) are the
default and user-specific attitudes, wat;oldt and w
at;new
t are the weights for old
and new attitude data, andAatt is the attitude ratio strength parameter for old
and new attitudes. The visceral core affect cavst is calculated with Equation
3.11. The arrow ( ) in Equation 3.32 indicates a memory reallocation.
3.2.4. Fear and pain
Bolles & Fanselow (1980) introduced a recuperative model of fear and pain.
In a critical situation, e.g. under attack, fear is elicited and pain is inhibited
until the subject has successfully dealt with the threat and can safely take
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whereApn is the pain normalization factor and pd is the pain decay parameter.
The inhibition effect is taken into account in the decision making module,
where fear and pain affect the robot’s action probabilities.
3.2.5. Heuristic action evaluation
In some emotional states, specifically happiness, anger and disgust as shown
in Table 2.4, analytic processing is replaced with, or overweighted by, heuris-
tic processing. An emotion-based measure is then used to select actions. We
use Q-learning, as in Cattinelli et al. (2008), to assign a measure for actions.







where Q(stt; at) is the Q-value for action at in state stt,  is the learning rate,
Rt is the reward achieved after performing at 1 in state stt 1, and  is the
discount factor.
The Q-values are updated when the rewards for previous actions are ob-
served. The rewards can be based on utility or emotional valence of the con-
sequences of the user’s reaction to the agent’s action. In this case, the valence
component of visceral core affect is used.
Rt = (1 0)  cavst (3.38)
The states are discrete, so in addition to emotional intensities, the physical
condition must be categorized. The categories are shown in Table 3.4. Each
state is the combination of the emotion with the highest intensity and the
physical condition, which makes up 4 2 2 2 = 32 possible states. For example,
one possible state is stt = (high fear; high pain; low bat:def).
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Table 3.4: Visceral state categories
3.2.6. Effects on the Decision Model
Emotions have effects on how risk is evaluated. When the probabilities of
different scenarios are calculated using forecasting models in decision making
and emotion generation, they are modified according to the current visceral
state. Table 2.4 summarizes the effects. First, let us define a decision weight




ppp + (1  p)p ; (3.39)
where the default parameter values are 0:44 for attractiveness (p) and 0:77
for discriminality (p).
Figure 3.5: The decision weight function
Now, the actual probability that is used in decision making and emotion dy-
namics is further biased with risk attitude. For optimistic risk perception, the
higher the utility and optimism, the higher its probability is perceived. Both











1A+ (1 0) mdt (3.40)
pt = (1 + rat  (ut   0:5))  w(p); (3.41)
where rat is the momentary risk attitude, Nem is the amount of emotions,
opt refers to the emotions with an optimistic and pes to the emotions with a
pessimistic risk perception, and pt is the perceived probability.
Emotions also affect the processing strategy. The more intense analytic emo-
tions are, the more the expected utility calculations are used. Openness can












cf = 1 + 3  (0:8  perO) (3.43)
P (at) / (Aps  (1 + aht)   (at) +Q(stt; at))cf ; (3.44)
where aht is the momentary analyticity, ana refers to the emotions with an
analytic and heu to the emotions with a heuristic processing strategy, perO is
the openness value of personality, P (at) is the probability of choosing action
at and Aps is the processing strategy normalization factor making expected
utilities and Q-values comparable. Compare to Equation 3.10.
The visceral state alters the weights for objectives. Positive emotions promote
higher order needs, fear and pain increase safety need, and battery deficiency
increases energy need.
W 1t = 10  4Rt + 5 bat:def:t (3.45)
W 2t = 8  2Rt + 5  (paint + feart) (3.46)
W 3t = 4 +Rt (3.47)
W 4t = 2 + 2Rt (3.48)








whereW it and w
ob;i
t are the weights and normalized weights of the objectives of
energy, security, being taken into account, being accepted and being updated,
and Rt is the pleasure component of visceral core affect shown in Equation
3.38.
Sometimes visceral factors can have a direct effect on behavior. A high amount
of fear increases probabilities for cry, alert and warn actions. Otherwise, high
pain will cause the ask for help and high battery deficiency the ask for charg-
ing action.
3.3. Robot features
The robot used in the model development can be seen in Figure 3.6. It has
a microprocessor, a LINUX-based operating system and sensors for temper-
ature, inclination, touch, light and strength. Its camera and audio system
enable user recognition and identifying conversation topics. The audio sys-
tem can also be used for estimating emotional content in the interaction. The
robot’s sensors, computational capacity and physical composition always place
constraints on the input and output of the model. (García, Pallardó, Insua,
Moreno & Redchuk 2012)
Figure 3.6: AISoy1 Robot (AISoy Robotics S.L. 2012)
3.4. Further research
Emotional models can never be perfect, not least because emotion is such a
complex issue that psychological and neurological research fails to provide
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coherent theories on it. Furthermore, each individual has different emotional
dynamics due to genes, personal history, culture and environment. In spite of
this, we can make the models more sophisticated and place focus on some area
depending on the application domain. Often it is not useful to replicate exact
human emotions for a robot, but rather to copy selected features to enhance
interaction.
In our model, the visceral state is only a subset of all actual factors. There is
no sex drive or disgust. The visceral core affect is biased and there should be
a complementary offset guiding the mood in addition to the adjusted weight-
ing. The model should be expanded by adding new emotions and other vis-
ceral factors when there is satisfactory research on their dynamics and ef-
fects on decision making. Cultural aspects are ignored even though they may
be very important. For example, people in the United States prefer anger to
fear whereas the Machiguenga Indians in the Peruvian Amazon prefer fear to
anger (Lerner & Keltner 2001). Emotion expression was not covered in this
work, but it is a very integral part of emotional communication and it should
be implemented in the robot. See Álvarez, Galán, Matía, Rodríguez-Losada &
Jiménez (2010) and Kirby et al. (2010) for examples.
Emotion regulation affects the emotional system in five stages: selecting the
situation, modifying the situation, deploying attention, changing cognition
and modulating the responses. In contrast to mood regulation, emotion regu-
lation targets specific emotions and associated responses (Gross 1998). Avoid-
ing sad states or expressing more anger could be useful in manipulating the
environment.
In social situations, a framework is needed for group engagement and roles.
When to initiate or conclude communication, how to understand the roles and
statuses of the participants and how to model social emotions e.g. shame.
Keltner & Haidt (1999) noted that emotions have diverse social functions.
They increase group solidarity, act as behavioral cues for children and exhibit
social status. Emotional expression generates emotions, for example anger
causes fear. Emotion recognition would be an important addition in the model.
Estimating the user’s utility in various states would enable e.g. gratifica-
tion and revenge. It is quite difficult because the user’s objectives need to be
assessed and actions linked to relevant goals. A model would have to be de-
veloped for each user and the parameters evaluated using interaction data.
Perhaps pattern recognition would be useful in this task.
Humans learn new actions by observing other people and by studying. A robot
might learn new actions by communicating with other robots or by examin-
ing user actions, although an advanced module for recognizing objects and
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entities would be mandatory. Also in this case, evaluating goal relatedness
of actions is vital. In a goal-oriented framework, the selection of goals, task
management and causal deduction are additional requirements. Ortony et al.
(1988) provide a popular model.
Further context identification and learning would be advantageous. For ex-
ample, knowing whether the robot is inside or outside would help in infer-
ring whether the user or the circumstances are responsible for temperature
changes. The agency and power, and motive-consistency in a goal-oriented
framework, dimensions of event appraisal (Roseman et al. 1990) are possible
to estimate only if context evaluation and inference modules exist.
Finally, development stages for emotion dynamics create more diverse and
adaptive results. Álvarez et al. (2010) divided the evolution of the emotional
system in three stages: the infant, the youth and the adult stage. In the infant
stage, the robot modified its emotional reactions based on external input, e.g.
a sentence "an insult should not make you so sad". In the youth stage, the
robot develops its emotional behaviour so that learns patterns to maximize
its happiness. In the adult stage, it can adapt to its environment as a means




In this thesis, we have introduced an emotional model for a social robot based
on event appraisal that acts together with a decision making model guiding
the robot’s behavior. The purpose of the work was to enhance the framework of
Esteban (2012) by adding a sophisticated humanlike emotional system, which
includes multilevel affect, comprised most notably of mood and discrete emo-
tions, personalities, relationships as attitudes, and advanced emotional dy-
namics using event appraisal, mood congruency and physical condition. The
emotional system should make the robot smoother and more believable in
social contexts.
Choosing a framework for the emotional system was very challenging because
there are a lot of competing theories on the different parts and components of
affect. There is even uncertainty on what emotions are (Russell 2003). There
are debates on whether there are some basic emotions (Ekman & Friesen
1971, Ortony & Turner 1990, Levenson et al. 1992, Izard 1992, Panksepp
1992, Turner & Ortony 1992), what the dimensions of emotions are (Watson
et al. 1988, Russell & Barrett 1999, Larsen & McGraw 2001), how emotions
evolve (Zajonc 1984, Lazarus 1984, Frijda et al. 1989, Roseman et al. 1990),
and what their effects on decisions are (Leone et al. 2005, Forgas 1995).
We succeeded in using several related theories to create a unified emotional
system. It is centered around a two-dimensional core affect. Mood integrates
the effects of momentary visceral states and a personality-related baseline,
and it is described on the core affect plane. The visceral state, which in-
volves emotions and the physical state, is mapped to the core affect plane
using intensities as weights. The emotional contents of events are generated
using utilities, probabilities and related risk measures as event appraisal di-
mensions. A disappointment measure is used for comparing expected and
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occurred events. The emotional content is transformed into emotional inten-
sities through a dynamic activation function which controls mood and trait
congruency of emotions.
The emotional system not only takes input from the decision making mod-
ule, but also affects its operation. The different risk perceptions of emotions
form a momentary risk attitudes based on momentary intensities and mood.
The risk attitude then shapes perceived probabilities, or decision weights, of
events. Emotions differ in processing strategies as well. They can provoke
analytic or heuristic thinking, and for a heuristic-focused emotional state, ac-
tion selection is influenced more by the values provided by Q-learning than by
the utilities and probabilities acquired from the forecasting models. Finally,
emotions affect the weighting of objectives. Negative emotions set the focus
on lower order needs, energy and security, whereas positive emotions promote
higher aspirations. Overall, the research objectives were well achieved.
The introduced framework is valuable, because it combines the emotional and
decision making systems and enables affective behavior which is crucial to
the sociable humans. The core affect measure of discrete emotions and other
visceral factors links the ambiguous, continuous mood with more easily iden-
tifiable affective states. Having an easily expandable multilevel affect allows
us to capture the various effects of the complex emotional system on decision
making. It is especially important to understand that emotions operate and
influence decisions on different levels which are interconnected. Emotions
can be linear in some parts of the system, but, on the whole, they are very
much non-linear and chaotic.
Further research is needed to estimate the parameters and test the validity
of the model. Simulation is often impossible, because the events depend on
the model-based robot behavior and the human users, whose reactions cannot
be predicted before there is interaction data. When parameters are changed,
this process has to be restarted. Gathering a data set on user reactions and
environment evolution in different settings could be useful in testing the var-
ious parts of the model and configuring initial parameters. The users decide
whether the robot is functional in its domain.
60
Bibliography
AISoy Robotics S.L. (2012), ‘AISoy Robotics’.
URL: http://www.aisoy.es/
Álvarez, M., Galán, R., Matía, F., Rodríguez-Losada, D. & Jiménez, A.
(2010), ‘An emotional model for a guide robot’, IEEE Transactions
on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics 40(5), 982–992.
Anderson, C. & Galinsky, A. D. (2006), ‘Power, optimism, and risk-
taking’, European Journal of Social Psychology 36(4), 511–536.
Batson, C. D. & Ahmad, N. (2001), ‘Empathy-induced altruism in
a prisoner’s dilemma II: what if the target of empathy has de-
fected?’, European Journal of Social Psychology 31(1), 25–36.
Bechara, A., Damasio, H. & Damasio, A. R. (2000), ‘Emotion, decision
making and the orbitofrontal cortex’, Cerebral Cortex 10(3), 295–
307.
Beedie, C. J., Terry, P. C. & Lane, A. M. (2005), ‘Distinctions between
emotion and mood’, Cognition and Emotion 19(6), 847–878.
Bellman, R. (1957), Dynamic Programming, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, NJ.
Berg, J., Dickhaut, J. & McCabe, K. (1995), ‘Trust, reciprocity, and so-
cial history’, Games and Economic Behavior 10(1), 122–142.
Bolles, R. C. & Fanselow, M. S. (1980), ‘A perceptual defensive recu-
perative model of fear and pain’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences
3(2), 291–301.
Busemeyer, J. R., Dimperio, E. & Jessup, R. K. (2007), Integrating emo-
tional processes into decision making models, in W. Gray, ed., ‘In-
tegrated models of cognitive systems’, Oxford University Press.
61
Camerer, C. & Thaler, R. H. (1995), ‘Ultimatums, dictators and man-
ners’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 9(2), 209–219.
Cattinelli, I., Goldwurm, M. & Borghese, N. A. (2008), ‘Interacting with
an artificial partner: modeling the role of emotional aspects’, Bio-
logical Cybernautics 99(6), 473–489.
Clemen, R. (1996), Making hard decisions: An introduction to decision
analysis, Duxbury, Pacific Grove, CA.
Clore, G. L. & Schnall, S. (2005), The influence of affect on attitude,
in D. Albarracín, B. T. Johnson & M. P. Zanna, eds, ‘Handbook of
attitudes’, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
Cohen, J. D. (2005), ‘The vulcanization of the human brain: A neural
perspective on interactions between cognition and emotion’, Jour-
nal of Economic Perspectives 19(4), 3–24.
Damasio, A. (1994), Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human
Brain, Putnam.
Damasio, A. R., Grabowski, T. J., Bechara, A., Damasio, H., Ponto, L.
L. B., Parvizi, J. & Hichwa, R. D. (2000), ‘Subcortical and corti-
cal brain activity during the feeling of self-generated emotions’,
Nature Neuroscience 3(10), 1049–1056.
Damasio, H. & Grabowski, T. (1994), ‘The return of Phineas Gage:
Clues about the brain from the skull of a famous patient’, Science
264(5162), 1102–1105.
de Vries, M., Holland, R. W. & Witteman, C. L. M. (2008), ‘Fitting deci-
sions: Mood and intuitive versus deliberative decision strategies’,
Cognition and Emotion 22(5), 931–943.
Delgado, M. R., Frank, R. H. & Phelps, E. A. (2005), ‘Perceptions of
moral character modulate the neural systems of reward during
the trust game’, Nature Neuroscience 8, 1611–1618.
Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E. & Smith, H. L. (1999), ‘Subjec-
tive well-being: Three decades of progress’, Psychological Bulletin
125(2), 276–302.
Eid, M.; Diener, E. (1999), ‘Intraindividual variability in affect: Relia-
bility, validity, and personality correlates’, Journal ol Personality
and Social Psychology 76(4), 662–676.
62
Ekman, P. (1992), ‘Are there basic emotions’, Psychological Review
99(3), 550–553.
Ekman, P. & Friesen, W. V. (1971), ‘Constants across cultures in the
face and emotion’, Journal ol Personality and Social Psychology
17(2), 124–129.
El-Nasr, M. S., Yen, J. & Ioerger, T. R. (2000), ‘FLAME – Fuzzy logic
adaptive model of emotions’, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems 3(3), 219–257.
Elliott, C. (1992), The affective reasoner: A process model of emotions
in a multi-agent system, PhD thesis, Northwestern University In-
stitute for the Learning Sciences, Northwestern, IL.
Engel, C. (2010), Dictator games: A meta study, Technical report, Max
Planck Institute.
Engle-Warnick, J. & Slonim, R. L. (2004), ‘The evolution of strategies
in a repeated trust game’, Journal of Economic Behavior & Orga-
nization 55(4), 553–573.
Esteban, P. G. (2012), Modeling and implementing an emotional based
decision agent. To appear in proceedings of XXXIII Congreso Na-
cional de Estadística e Investigación Operativa.
Fessler, D. M. T., Pillsworth, E. G. & Flamson, T. J. (2004), ‘Angry men
and disgusted women: An evolutionary approach to the influence
of emotions on risk taking’, Organizational Behavior and Human
Decision Processes 95(1), 107–123.
Forgas, J. P. (1995), ‘Mood and judgment: The affect infusion model
(AIM)’, Psychological Bulletin 117(1), 39–66.
Frank, M. J. & Claus, E. D. (2006), ‘Anatomy of a decision: Striato-
orbitofrontal interactions in reinforcement learning, decision
making, and reversal’, Psychological Review 113(2), 300–326.
Frijda, N. H., Kuipers, P. & ter Schure, E. (1989), ‘Relations among
emotion, appraisal, and emotional action readiness’, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 57(2), 212–228.
García, D., Pallardó, C., Insua, D., Moreno, R. & Redchuk, A. (2012),




Glimcher, P., Camerer, C., Fehr, E. & Poldrack, R. (2008), Neuroe-
conomics: Decision making and the brain, AcademicPress, New
York.
Gonzalez, R. & Wu, G. (1999), ‘On the shape of the probability weight-
ing function’, Cognitive Psychology 38(1), 129–166.
Gratch, J. & Marsella, S. (2004), ‘A domain-independent framework
for modeling emotion’, Journal of Cognitive Systems Research
5(4), 269–306.
Gratch, J., Marsella, S., Wang, N. & Stankovic, B. (2009), Assessing the
validity of appraisal-based models of emotion, in ‘International
Conference on Affective Computing and Intelligent Interaction’,
ACII2009.
Gross, J. J. (1998), ‘The emerging field of emotion regulation: An inte-
grative review’, Review of General Psychology 2(3), 271–299.
Gunnthorsdottir, A., Houser, D. & McCabe, K. (2007), ‘Disposition, his-
tory and contributions in public goods experiments’, Journal of
Economic Behavior & Organization 62(2), 304–315.
Hagerty, M. R. (1999), ‘Testing maslow’s hierarchy of needs: National
quality-of-life across time’, Social Indicators Research 46(3), 249–
271.
Heller, W. (1993), ‘Neuropsychological mechanisms of individual dif-
ferences in emotion, personality, and arousal’, Neuropsychology
7(4), 476–489.
Hoeting, J. A., Madigan, D., Raftery, A. E. & Volinsky, C. T.
(1999), ‘Bayesian model averaging: A tutorial’, Statistical Science
14(4), 382–417.
Hofstede, G. (1984), ‘The cultural relativity of the quality of life con-
cept’, Academy of Management Review 9(3), 389–398.
Izard, C. E. (1992), ‘Basic emotions, relations among emotions, and
emotion-cognition relations’, Psychological Review 99(3), 561–565.
64
Izard, C. E. (1993), ‘Four systems for emotion activation: Cognitive and
noncognitive processes’, Psychological Review 100(1), 68–90.
Izard, C. E. (1994), ‘Innate and universal facial expressions: Evidence
from developmental and cross-cultural research’, Psychological
Bulletin 115(2), 288–299.
Janis, I. L. & Leventhal, H. (1967), Human reactions to stress, in
E. Borgatta & W. Lambert, eds, ‘Handbook of personality theory
and research’, Rand McNally, Chicago.
Johnson-Laird, P. N. & Oatley, K. (1989), ‘The language of emotions: An
analysis of a semantic field’, Cognition and Emotion 3(2), 81–123.
Kaelbling, L. P., Littman, M. L. & Moore, A. W. (1996), ‘Reinforce-
ment learning: a survey’, Journal of Artificial Intelligence Re-
search 4, 237–285.
Kahneman, D. (2011), Thinking, Fast and Slow, Farrar, Straus and
Giroux.
Keltner, D. & Haidt, J. (1999), ‘Social functions of emotions at four
levels of analysis’, Cognition and Emotion 13, 505–521.
Kirby, R., Forlizzi, J. & Simmons, R. (2010), ‘Affective social robots’,
Robotics and Autonomous Systems 58(3), 322–332.
Kuppens, R., Oravecz, Z. & Tuerlinckx, F. (2010), ‘Feelings change: Ac-
counting for individual differences in the temporal dynamics of
affect’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 99(6), 1042–
1060.
Kurzban, R. & Houser, D. (2005), ‘Experiments investigating coopera-
tive types in humans: A complement to evolutionary theory and
simulations’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of
the United States of America 102(5), 1803–1807.
Larsen, J. T. & McGraw, A. P. (2001), ‘Can people feel happy and sad
at the same time?’, Journal oi Personality and Social Psychology
81(4), 684–696.
Lazarus, R. S. (1984), ‘On the primacy of cognition’, American Psychol-
ogist 39(2), 124–129.
65
LeDoux, J. E. (1995), ‘Emotion: Clues from the brain’, Annual Review
of Psychology 46, 209–235.
Leone, L., Perugini, M. & Bagozzi, R. P. (2005), ‘Emotions and deci-
sion making: Regulatory focus moderates the influence of antic-
ipated emotions on action evaluations’, Cognition and Emotion
19(8), 1175–1198.
Lerner, J. S. & Keltner, D. (2000), ‘Beyond valence: Toward a model
of emotion-specific influences on judgement and choice’, Cognition
and Emotion 14(4), 473–493.
Lerner, J. S. & Keltner, D. (2001), ‘Fear, anger, and risk’, Journal of
Personality and Social Psychology 81(1), 146–159.
Levenson, R. W., Ekman, P., Heider, K. & Friesen, W. V. (1992), ‘Emo-
tion and autonomic nervous system activity in the Minangkabau
of West Sumatra’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
62(6), 972–988.
Loewenstein, G. (1996), ‘Out of control: Visceral influences on be-
havior’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
65(3), 272–292.
Loewenstein, G. (2000), ‘Emotions in economic theory and economic
behavior’, The American Economic Review 90(2), 426–432.
Loewenstein, G. & Lerner, J. S. (2003), The role of affect in decision
making, in R. J. Davidson, K. R. Scherer & H. H. Goldsmith, eds,
‘Handbook of Affective Sciences’, Oxford University Press.
Mamdani, E. H. & Assilian, S. (1975), ‘An experiment in linguistic syn-
thesis with a fuzzy logic controller’, International Journal of Man-
Machine Studies 7(1), 1–13.
Marcus, G. E. & Mackuen, M. B. (1993), ‘Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the
vote: The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement
during presidential campaigns’, American Political Science Review
87(3), 672–685.
Markon, K. E., Krueger, R. F. & Watson, D. (2005), ‘Delineating the
structure of normal and abnormal personality: An integrative hi-
erarchical approach’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
88(1), 139–157.
66
Maslow, A. H. (1943), ‘A theory of human motivation’, Psychological
Review 50(4), 370–396.
McCrae, R. R. & P. T. Costa, J. (1997), ‘Personality trait structure as a
human universal’, American Psychologist 52(5), 509–516.
McDermott, R. (2004), ‘The feeling of rationality: The meaning of neu-
roscientific advances for political science’, Perspectives on Politics
2(4), 691–706.
Mellers, B. A., Schwatz, A., Ho, K. & Ritov, I. (1997), ‘Decision affect
theory: Emotional reactions to the outcomes of risky options’, Psy-
chological Science 8(6), 423–429.
Moshkina, L. (2006), An integrative framework for affective agent be-
havior, in ‘Proceedings of the International Conference on Intelli-
gent Systems and Control’, IASTED.
Moshkina, L. (2011), An Integrative Framework of Time-Varying Affec-
tive Robotic Behavior, PhD thesis, Georgia Institute of Technology.
Öhman, A. & Soares, J. J. F. (1998), ‘Emotional conditioning to masked
stimuli: Expectancies for aversive outcomes following nonrecog-
nized fear-relevant stimuli’, Journal of Experimental Psychology
127(1), 69–82.
Olson, M. A. & Fazio, R. H. (2001), ‘Implicit attitude formation through
classical conditioning’, Psychological Science 12(5), 413–417.
Ortony, A., Clore, G. & Collins, A. (1988), The Cognitive Structure of
Emotions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Ortony, A. & Turner, T. J. (1990), ‘What’s basic about basic emotions?’,
Psychological Review 97(3), 315–331.
Palm, R., Hodgson, M., Blanchard, D. & Lyons, D. (1990), Earthquake
insurance in California, Westview Press, Boulder, CO.
Panksepp, J. (1992), ‘A critical role for "affective neuroscience" in re-
solving what is basic about basic emotions’, Psychological Review
99(3), 554–560.
Pavlov, I. P. (1927), Conditioned reflexes: An investigation of the phys-
iological activity of the cerebral cortex, Oxford University Press,
London.
67
Pham, M. T. (2007), ‘Emotion and rationality: A critical review and in-
terpretation of empirical evidence’, Review of General Psychology
11(2), 155–178.
Phan, K. L., Wager, T., Taylor, S. F. & Liberzon, I. (2002), ‘Functional
neuroanatomy of emotion: A meta-analysis of emotion activation
studies in PET and fMRI’, NeuroImage 16(2), 331–348.
Picard, R. (1997), Affective computing, MIT Press, Cambridge.
Picard, R. W. (2003), ‘Affective computing: challenges’, International
Journal of Human-Computer Studies 59(1), 55–64.
Price, D. D., Barrell, J. E. & Barrell, J. J. (1985), ‘A quantitative-
experiential analysis of human emotions’, Motivation and Emo-
tion 9(1), 19–38.
Raghunathan, R. & Pham, M. T. (1999), ‘All negative moods are not
equal: Motivational influences of anxiety and sadness on decision
making’, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes
79(1), 56–77.
Rázuri, J. G., Esteban, P. G. & Ríos Insua, D. (2011), An adversarial
risk analysis model for an emotional based decision agent, in ‘Neu-
ral Information Processing System Conference 2011’, NIPS2011.
Reisenzein, R. (1994), ‘Pleasure-arousal theory and the intensity
of emotions’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
67(3), 525–539.
Rickel, J. & Johnson, W. L. (1999), ‘Animated agents for procedural
training in virtual reality: Perception, cognition, and motor con-
trol’, Applied Artificial Intelligence 13(4-5), 343–382.
Ríos Insua, D., Ríos, J. & Banks, D. (2009), ‘Adversarial risk analysis’,
Journal of the American Statistical Association 104(406), 841–
854.
Roseman, I. J., Spindel, M. S. & Jose, P. E. (1990), ‘Appraisals of
emotion-eliciting events: Testing a theory of discrete emotions’,
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59(5), 899–915.
Russell, J. A. (2003), ‘Core affect and the psychological construction of
emotion’, Psychological Review 110(1), 145–172.
68
Russell, J. A. & Barrett, L. F. (1999), ‘Core affect, prototypical
emotional episodes, and other things called emotion: Dissect-
ing the elephant.’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
76(5), 805–819.
Rusting, C. L. (1998), ‘Personality, mood, and cognitive processing of
emotional information: Three conceptual frameworks’, Psycholog-
ical Bulletin 124(2), 165–196.
Rusting, C. L. & DeHart, T. (2000), ‘Retrieving positive memories to
regulate negative mood: Consequences for mood-congruent mem-
ory’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 78(4), 737–752.
Sanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E. & Cohen,
J. D. (2003), ‘The neural basis of economic decision-making in the
ultimatum game’, Science 300(5626), 1755–1758.
Scherer, K. R. (2000), Psychological models of emotion, in J. C. Borod,
ed., ‘The Neuropsychology of Emotion’, Oxford University Press.
Schmidtke, J. I. & Heller, W. (2004), ‘Personality, affect and EEG:
predicting patterns of regional brain activity related to extraver-
sion and neuroticism’, Personality and Individual Differences
36(3), 717–732.
Schwarz, N. (2000), ‘Emotion, cognition, and decision making’, Cogni-
tion and Emotion 14(4), 433–440.
Smith, C. A. & Lazarus, R. (1990), Emotion and adaptation, in L. A.
Pervin, ed., ‘Handbook of Personality: Theory and research’, Guil-
ford Press, New York, NY, pp. 609–637.
Tay, L. & Diener, E. (2011), ‘Needs and subjective well-being around the
world’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 101(2), 354–
365.
Tiedens, L. Z. & Linton, S. (2001), ‘Judgment under emotional cer-
tainty and uncertainty: The effects of specific emotions on infor-
mation processing’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology
81(6), 973–988.
Turner, T. J. & Ortony, A. (1992), ‘Basic emotions: Can conflicting cri-
teria converge?’, Psychological Review 99(3), 566–571.
69
Tversky, A. & Kahneman, D. (1992), ‘Advances in prospect theory: Cu-
mulative representation of uncertainty’, Journal of Risk and Un-
certainty 5(4), 297–323.
Velásquez, J. D. (1998), Modeling emotion-based decision making, in
D. Cañamero, ed., ‘Emotional and Intelligent: The Tangled Knot
of Cognition’, AAAI Press.
Vytal, K. & Hamann, S. (2010), ‘Neuroimaging support for discrete
neural correlates of basic emotions: A voxel-based meta-analysis’,
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience 22(12), 2864–2885.
Wallis, J. D. (2007), ‘Orbitofrontal cortex and its contribution to
decision-making’, Annual Review of Neuroscience 30, 31–56.
Watson, D., Clark, L. A. & Tellegen, A. (1988), ‘Development and vali-
dation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The panas
scales’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 54(6), 1063–
1070.
Wicker, F. W., Brown, G., Wiehe, J. A., Hagen, A. S. & Reed, J. L.
(1993), ‘On reconsidering Maslow: An examination of the depri-
vation/dominance proposition’, Journal of Research in Personality
27(2), 118–133.
Zajonc, R. B. (1984), ‘Feeling and thinking: Preferences need no infer-
ences’, American Psychologist 35(2), 151–175.
70
Appendix A
Vytal’s review of neurological discrete emotion
studies
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